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ABSTRACT 
In this paper we calculate robustly optimal monetary policy rules for several variants of a
simple optimizing model of the monetary transmission mechanism with sticky prices and/or wages.
We discuss representations of optimal policy both in terms of interest-rate feedback rules that
generalize the well-known “Taylor rule,” and in terms of commitment to a target criterion of the
kind discussed in familiar proposals for “flexible inflation targeting.” 
Optimal rules, however, require that policy be history-dependent in ways not contemplated
by many well-known proposals. We furthermore find that a robustly optimal policy rule is almost
inevitably an implicit rule, that requires the central bank to use a structural model to project the
economy's evolution under the contemplated policy action. Finally, our numerical examples suggest
that optimal rules do not place nearly as much weight on projections of inflation or output many
quarters in the future as occurs under the current practice of inflation-forecast targeting central banks.
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woodford@princeton.eduIn a companion paper (Giannoni and Woodford, 2002), we have expounded a general
approach to the design of an optimal criterion on the basis of which a central bank should
determine its operating target for the level of overnight interest rates. Our discussion there
was framed in the context of a fairly general linear-quadratic policy problem. Here we
consider the implications of our approach in the context of a particular (admittedly stylized)
model of the monetary transmission mechanism, or rather a group of related variant models.1
This allows us to address a number of questions raised by recent characterizations of actual
central-bank policies in terms of “Taylor rules” or “ﬂexible inﬂation targets”.
One basic question is whether it makes sense for a central bank’s policy commitment to
be formulated in terms of a relationship between the bank’s interest-rate instrument, some
measure of inﬂation, and some measure of an “output gap” that the bank seeks to ensure will
hold — as is true both of the interest-rate rule recommended by Taylor (1993) and common
formulations of “ﬂexible inﬂation targeting” rules. Can a desirable policy rule be expressed
without reference to a monetary aggregate? Can the rule be optimal despite a lack of any
explicit dependence of policy upon the nature of the exogenous disturbances aﬀecting the
economy? If a desirable rule can be expressed in terms of a relation between these variables,
which inﬂation measure, and which conception of the output gap should it involve? And
how do the optimal coeﬃcients of the respective variables depend on quantitative features
of one’s model of the monetary transmission mechanism?
A particular concern here will be with the optimal dynamic speciﬁcation of a monetary
policy rule. Taylor’s well-known proposal prescribes a purely contemporaneous relation
between the federal funds rate target, an inﬂation measure, and an output-gap measure; but
estimated central-bank reaction functions (e.g., Judd and Rudebusch, 1998) always involve
additional partial-adjustment dynamics for the funds rate, and sometimes other sorts of
lagged responses as well. To what extent are such lags in the rule used to set interest
1While the general approach to the construction of robustly optimal policy rules used here is the same
as that discussed in the companion paper, the derivations presented here are self-contained and do not rely
upon any of the results for the general linear-quadratic problem presented in the earlier paper. It is our hope
that a self-contained exposition of the relevant calculations for these simple models will serve to increase
insight into the method, in addition to delivering results of interest with regard to these particular models.
1rate desirable? Some empirical studies (e.g., Clarida et al., 2000) imply that central banks
respond to forecasts of the future levels of inﬂation and/or output rather than to current
values. Is this preferable, and if so, how far in the future should these forecasts look?
We address these questions here along the lines proposed in Giannoni and Woodford
(2002). Rather than optimizing over some parametric family of policy rules, we consider
the design of a rule in order to bring about the optimal equilibrium pattern of responses
to disturbances — more precisely, to determine an equilibrium that is optimal from the
“timeless perspective” explained in our previous paper. In addition to requiring the rule
to be consistent with this optimal equilibrium, we ask that the rule imply that rational
expectations equilibrium should be determinate, so that commitment to the rule can be
relied upon to bring about the desired equilibrium rather than some other, less desirable
one. We also construct rules that can expressed purely in terms of the “target variables”
that the central bank seeks to stabilize, and that are optimal regardless of the nature of the
(additive) exogenous disturbances to which the economy is subject, and regardless of the
statistical properties of those disturbances. The requirement that our rule simultaneously
satisfy each of these desiderata allows us to narrow the class of optimal rules to a fairly small
set; among these, we give primary attention to those rules that are simplest in form. Even
so, we are typically left with more than one possible representation of optimal policy. In
particular, in most of the cases considered here, optimal policy can be represented either by
a generalized Taylor rule or by a history-dependent inﬂation target, and we discuss both of
these formulations.
1 Optimal Rules for a Simple Forward-Looking Model
We ﬁrst illustrate our method of constructing robustly optimal policy rules in the context of
the basic optimizing model of the monetary transmission mechanism expounded in Woodford
(2002, chap. 4), and used as the basis for the discussion of the optimal responses to real
disturbances in Woodford (1999a) and Giannoni (2001). The model may be reduced to two
2structural equations
xt = Etxt+1 ¡ ¾(it ¡ Et¼t+1 ¡ r
n
t ) (1.1)
¼t = ·xt + ¯Et¼t+1 + ut (1.2)
for the determination of the inﬂation rate ¼t and the output gap xt, given the central bank’s
control of its short-term nominal interest-rate instrument it, and the evolution of the com-
posite exogenous disturbances rn
t and ut. Here the output gap is deﬁned relative to an
exogenously varying natural rate of output, chosen to correspond to the gap that belongs
among the target variables in the central bank’s loss function. The “cost-push shock” ut
then represents exogenous variation in the gap between the ﬂexible-price equilibrium level
of output and this natural rate, due for example to time-varying distortions that alter the
degree of ineﬃciency of the ﬂexible-price equilibrium.2 The microfoundations for this model
imply that ¾;· > 0; and that 0 < ¯ < 1: The unconditional expectation of the natural rate
of interest process is given by E(rn) = ¯ r ´ ¡log¯ > 0; while the cost-push disturbance
is normalized to have an unconditional expectation E(u) = 0: Otherwise, our theoretical
assumptions place no a priori restrictions upon the statistical properties of the disturbance
processes, and we shall be interested in policy rules that are optimal in the case of a general
speciﬁcation of the additive disturbance processes of the form discussed in Giannoni and
Woodford (2002, sec. 4).
The assumed objective of monetary policy is to minimize the expected value of a loss









where the discount factor ¯ is the same as in (1.2), and the loss each period is given by
Lt = ¼
2
t + ¸x(xt ¡ x
¤)
2 + ¸i(it ¡ i
¤)
2; (1.4)
for certain optimal levels x¤;i¤ ¸ 0 of the output gap and the nominal interest rate, and
certain weights ¸x;¸i > 0: A welfare-theoretic justiﬁcation is given for this form of loss
2See Woodford (2002, chap. 6) for discussion of the welfare-relevant output gap and of the nature of
“cost-push shocks”.
3function in Woodford (2002, chap. 6), where the parameters are related to those of the
model of the structural model. However, our conclusions below are presented in terms
of the parameters of the loss function (1.4), and are applicable in the case of any loss
function of this general form, whether the weights and target values are the ones that can
be justiﬁed on welfare-theoretic grounds or not. In the numerical results presented below,
the model parameters are calibrated as in Table 1 of Woodford (1999a). (For convenience,
the parameters are reported in Table 1 below.)
1.1 The Optimal Taylor Rule
Before turning to the question of fully optimal policy in this model, it may be of interest to
brieﬂy consider the optimal choice of a rule within a restricted class that has been widely
discussed, which is to say, the class of “simple Taylor rules”,3
it = ¯ { + Á¼(¼t ¡ ¯ ¼) + Áx(xt ¡ ¯ x)=4; (1.5)
involving only contemporaneous feedback from the inﬂation rate and the output gap, and no
direct responses to real disturbances.4 A rule of this form reﬂects the intuitive notion that
it may be desirable to adjust the bank’s instrument in response to deviations of its target
variables (other than the instrument itself) from certain desired levels. The conditions for
such a rule to imply a determinate equilibrium in this model have already been treated in
Woodford (2002, chap. 4).
A rule of the form (1.5) represents an example of a purely forward-looking rule, so if it
implies a determinate equilibrium, that equilibrium is one in which all three target variables
3In the rule proposed by Taylor (1993), the inﬂation variable is actually the most recent four-quarter
change in the GDP deﬂator, whereas we here consider rules that respond to the change from the previous
to the current quarter only. However, Taylor’s intention seems to have been to assume feedback from
contemporaneous measures of the Fed’s (implicit) target variables. We here assume that the central bank
seeks to stabilize the one-period inﬂation rate ¼t rather than some average of inﬂation over a longer time
span, because this is the objective that we have been able to justify on welfare-theoretic grounds, in Woodford
(2002, chap. 6). Our analysis is also simplest in this case, though similar methods could be used to analyze
optimal policy in the case of an alternative inﬂation-stabilization objective, that might reﬂect the true goal
of a particular central bank.
4The coeﬃcient on the output gap is denoted Áx=4 rather than Áx; so that Áx corresponds to Taylor’s
output-gap coeﬃcient, writing the rule in terms of annualized data. Here we assume that “periods” of our
model correspond to quarters.
4will be functions solely of the current and expected future values of the real disturbances.
Hence the best pattern of responses to disturbances that could possibly be implemented by
a rule in this family is the one that we have called the optimal non-inertial plan in Woodford
(1999a). In general, even the optimal non-inertial plan can only be implemented by a rule
more complex than (1.5). One case in which a rule of this form suﬃces, however — at
least for an open set of possible parameter values — is that in which both the rn
t and ut
disturbances are Markovian (i.e., ﬁrst-order autoregressive processes), as assumed in the
numerical examples presented in Woodford (1999a) and Giannoni (2001). In such a case,
the rule that implements the optimal non-inertial plan is clearly the optimal member of the
family, and this makes calculation of the optimal Taylor rule quite straightforward.
Thus we assume once again disturbances of the form
ˆ r
n
t = ½rˆ r
n
t¡1 + ²rt; (1.6)
ut = ½uut¡1 + ²ut; (1.7)
where ˆ rn
t ´ rn
t ¡ ¯ r; ²rt and ²ut are i.i.d. mean-zero exogenous shocks, and 0 · ½r;½u < 1: In
this case, the constraints upon the feasible evolution of the target variables f¼t;xt;itg from
date t onward depend only upon the vector of current disturbances et ´ [ˆ rn
t ut]0; and the
optimal non-inertial plan is given by linear functions of the form
zt = ¯ z + Fet; it = ¯ { + fiet;
where zt ´ [¼t xt]0 is the vector of endogenous variables other than the policy instrument.
The long-run average values ¯ z;¯ { and response coeﬃcients F;fi are given in the Appendix
(section A.1).
In the (generic) case that the matrix F is invertible, an instrument rule consistent with
this pattern of responses to shocks is given by
it = ¯ { + fiF
¡1(zt ¡ ¯ z); (1.8)
which takes the form of a simple Taylor rule (1.5). Note that while we have here written the
rule in terms of deviations from implicit targets for each of the variables that correspond to
5the optimal long-run average values of these variables, the only thing that matters for the
constrained optimality of (1.8) is the value of the total intercept term
¯ { ¡ fiF
¡1¯ z:
Of course, the above derivation guarantees only that the suggested rule is consistent with
the equilibrium responses to shocks that constitute the optimal non-inertial plan. In order
to implement the plan, we also need for the rule to imply a determinate equilibrium. The
conditions under which this will be true have been discussed in Woodford (2002, chap. 4).
The following result states conditions under which the coeﬃcients of the rule just proposed
satisfy this additional requirement .
Proposition 4. Suppose the disturbances are of the form (1.6) – (1.7), with autocor-
relation coeﬃcients satisfying the bounds
0 < (1 ¡ ½r)(1 ¡ ¯½r) ¡ ½r·¾




Then (1.8) deﬁnes a Taylor rule of the form (1.5) with coeﬃcients Á¼ > 1;Áx > 0: Fur-
thermore, commitment to this rule implies a determinate rational expectations equilibrium,
which implements the optimal non-inertial plan.
The proof is given in the Appendix. Note that the inequalities assumed in the proposition
may equivalently be written
½ < ½u · ½r < ¯ ½;
where ½ < ¯ ½ and the bounds are functions of the model parameters ¯; ·; ¾ and ¸i: Thus
there is an open set of values of ½r and ½u for which the conditions are satisﬁed, and these
are not obviously unreasonable; for example, the calibrated values reported in Table 1 below
satisfy these conditions.
6Under the conditions assumed in this last proposition, we thus obtain theoretical justi-
ﬁcation for crucial aspects of Taylor’s recommendation. In particular, we provide support
for his recommendation that the operating target for the federal funds rate should respond
positively to ﬂuctuations in both the current inﬂation rate and the current output gap. The
rule proposed here also satisﬁes the “Taylor Principle”, according to which an increase in
inﬂation above the target rate results in an even greater increase in the nominal interest
rate.
The need for non-zero response coeﬃcients for both target variables follows from a desire
to implement the optimal non-inertial responses to two distinct types of real disturbances
— disturbances to the natural rate rn
t and “cost-push shocks” ut — or more precisely, to
respond optimally to any of a range of real disturbances, which shift the model’s structural
equations in these two diﬀerent ways to diﬀering extents. If instead we assume that there
are no cost-push shocks — not that there are no “supply” disturbances, but that all real
disturbances shift the natural rate of output and the eﬃcient rate of output to the same
extent — then the requirement that our rule implement the optimal non-inertial response
to disturbances to the natural rate of interest imposes only a single linear restriction upon
the coeﬃcients Á¼ and Áx;5 and it is possible to ﬁnd a rule that implements the optimal
non-inertial plan with Áx = 0: On the other hand, adding the requirement that the rule also
implement the optimal non-inertial response to cost-push shocks, should they ever occur, has
no cost in terms of a less desirable response to disturbances to the natural rate of interest,6
and thus robustness concerns make it advisable that policy respond to variations in the
output gap as well. Interestingly the optimal degree of response to variations in the output
gap is independent of the assumed importance of cost-push shocks (i.e., the assumed variance
of the ut disturbance); all that matters for the recommendation (1.8) is the assumed degree
5This case is analyzed in Woodford (1999a).
6We assume here that there is no diﬃculty in measuring and hence responding to either of the target
variables, inﬂation and the output gap. In practice, measurement of the output gap is likely to be more
problematic, and for this reason implementation of the optimal non-inertial responses to variations in rn
t
through a rule that involves a large coeﬃcient Áx may result in some deterioration in the ability of policy to
successfully respond to those disturbances. The problem of the optimal conduct of policy when measurement
problems are taken into account is considered below in section 3.3.
7of serial correlation of such disturbances when they occur.
Our analysis also provides at least partial support for Taylor’s recommendation of what
we have called a direct policy rule: one that speciﬁes adjustment of the instrument purely in
terms of feedback from the observed (or projected) behavior of the target variables. Of course
we have not shown that the rule (1.8) cannot be improved upon; but we have shown that it
is optimal within the class of purely forward-looking rules. This means that if we consider
only possible dependence of the central bank’s instrument upon various state variables that
are relevant to the determination of current of future values of the target variables, there
is no possible gain from introducing dependence upon variables other than those already
allowed for in (1.5).
In particular, our analysis justiﬁes Taylor’s neglect of any response to projections of
future inﬂation or output gaps, as opposed to projections for the current quarter. If we were
to introduce additional terms representing feedback from Et¼t+j or Etxt+k for some horizons
j;k > 0; the optimal rule within that broader family would achieve no better an outcome.
For such a rule would continue to be purely forward-looking, and so could at best implement
the optimal non-inertial plan, and this is already achieved by the optimal Taylor rule, under
the assumptions of Proposition 4.
Nor is it even entirely correct to say that a forecast-based rule would be an equally useful
way of achieving the same outcome. Under the assumption that the central bank has access
to perfectly accurate forecasts (so that a forecast-based rule can, in principle, involve exactly
the same equilibrium adjustment of interest rates as under a Taylor rule), then the optimal
response coeﬃcients become larger the longer the horizon of the forecasts that are used to
implement policy. For example, suppose we consider forward-looking Taylor rules of the
form
it = ¯ { + Á¼(Et¼t+k ¡ ¯ ¼) + Áx(Etxt+k ¡ ¯ x)=4; (1.9)
for a given forecast horizon k > 0; and for simplicity assume that ½r = ½u = ½; for some
0 < ½ < 1:7 Then the unique rule within this family that is consistent with the optimal
7Note that in the case that either ½r or ½u is equal to zero, it will be impossible for a purely forecast-based
8non-inertial plan is given by
it = ¯ { + ½
¡kfiF
¡1(Etzt+k ¡ ¯ z); (1.10)
both response coeﬃcients must be multiplied by the factor ½¡k > 1; which may be quite
large in the case of a horizon several quarters in the future.8 But such an alternative rule
has the unpalatable feature that it involves a commitment to extremely strong responses to
something that, in practice, is likely to be estimated with considerable error.
Furthermore, even when highly accurate conditional forecasts are available, a commit-
ment to strong response to them by the central bank makes it likely that equilibrium will be
indeterminate.9 For the class of forward-looking rules just considered, we can establish the
following.
Proposition 5. For all forecast horizons k longer than some critical value, the rule of
the form (1.9) that is consistent with the optimal non-inertial plan implies indeterminacy of
rational-expectations equilibrium.
The proof is in the Appendix.10 Thus if the forecast horizon k is suﬃciently long, it is
not possible to implement the optimal non-inertial plan using a rule of the form (1.9).11 It
follows that, at least when the parameters satisfy the conditions of Proposition 4, the best
rule in this family is not as desirable as the best simple Taylor rule.
rule such as (1.9) to implement the optimal non-inertial plan, because under that pattern of responses to
disturbances, the forecasts will not reveal information about the current value of the transitory disturbance.
8For example, if we assume a serial correlation coeﬃcient of ½ = :35; as in the baseline calibration in
Woodford (1999a), and a forecast horizon k of 8 quarters, a fairly typical horizon for inﬂation-targeting
central banks, this factor is greater than 4000.
9Recall the discussion of this defect of forward-looking rules in Woodford (2002, chap. 4, sec. 2.2). The
possibility that too strong a response to forecasts can lead to indeterminacy was ﬁrst shown by Bernanke
and Woodford (1997), while the possibility that too long a forecast horizon can lead to indeterminacy is
illustrated by Levin et al.(2001).
10In independent recent work, Batini and Pearlman (2002) establish a related result for a general family
of interest-rate feedback rules in which the current nominal interest rate operating target is a linear function
of an inﬂation forecast and a lagged nominal interest rate. Our result here, however, is not strictly implied
by the one that they state.
11For example, in the case of the calibrated parameter values given in Table 1 below, the rule (1.10) implies
indeterminacy for all k ¸ 1:
9In the case of the calibrated parameter values proposed in Table 1 below, including the
values ½r = ½u = :35 for the serial correlation of the disturbance processes, the optimal
Taylor rule is given by
i
ann
t = :03 + 1:72¼
ann
t + :57xt; (1.11)
where we now (for comparability with Taylor’s prescription) report the rule in terms of an
annualized interest rate and inﬂation rate (iann
t = 4it; ¼ann
t = 4¼t).12 These parameter values
are quite similar to those recommended by Taylor. Particularly worthy of note is the sub-
stantial response coeﬃcient Áx for variations in the output gap; thus the low assumed value
for ¸x (relative to ad hoc loss functions often assumed in the literature on monetary policy
evaluation) does not imply a low Taylor-rule response coeﬃcient, relative to conventional
recommendations.13 If, instead, one believes that a proper weight on output-gap stabiliza-
tion as a policy goal requires that ¸x be much higher than the value assumed here, the
optimal value of Áx should be correspondingly higher; see equation (1.12) below.
Probably the most important diﬀerence between this constrained-optimal rule and Tay-
lor’s is that the implicit target inﬂation rate here is near zero, whereas Taylor assumes a
target rate of 2 percent per year. It is important also to note that the value Áx = :57 refers to
the optimal response to ﬂuctuations in a theoretical concept of the output gap (xt ´ ˆ Yt¡ ˆ Y e
t )
that may not correspond too closely to conventional “output gap” measures, which are often
simply real GDP relative to some smooth trend.14 Instead, the microeconomic foundations
of our model imply that the eﬃcient level of output ˆ Y e
t should be aﬀected by real distur-
12While the value of ¯ reported in Table 1 is equal to .99, rounding to only two signiﬁcant digits, and this
value would imply that ¯ { should equal approximately :01 per quarter, 4 percent per year, the estimates of
Rotemberg and Woodford (1997) actually imply a long-run average real federal funds rate closer to 3 per
cent per year, so this is the value reported for 4¯ { here. Because the Rotemberg-Woodford estimates imply
an optimal inﬂation target only slightly above zero, the value of the constant term in this rule is essentially
the value of the annualized interest rate consistent with zero average inﬂation.
13In particular, this result shows that the reason for the extremely low optimal output-response coeﬃcients
obtained in the study of Rotemberg and Woodford (1999) is not the low value of ¸x assumed in that analysis;
it is rather the fact that in their various families of simple policy rules, the coeﬃcients in question indicate
response to a conventional output-gap measure rather than to the welfare-relevant gap, as discussed below.
14In the case of Taylor’s (1993) discussion of the degree to which his proposed rule could account for actual
US policy under Greenspan’s chairmanship of the Fed, the linearly detrended log of real GDP is used an
empirical proxy for xt:
10bances of all sorts (including some that would conventionally be classiﬁed as “demand”
disturbances), and these disturbances may include some high or medium-frequency compo-
nents. If one were instead to ask what the constrained-optimal rule would be within the
simple family (1.5), but with xt replaced by detrended output ˆ Yt, the optimal value of the
output coeﬃcient may be quite diﬀerent — it need not even be positive! For example, Gali
(2000) considers this question in the context of a calibrated model similar to our baseline
model, in which the real disturbances are technology shocks, and concludes that the optimal
output response coeﬃcient is zero when detrended output is used in the Taylor rule instead
of the theoretically correct gap measure. Rotemberg and Woodford (1999) reach a similar
conclusion (an optimal output-gap coeﬃcient of only 0.02) in the context of their related but
more complex model, with disturbance processes inferred from US time series. In the case
that there are substantial deviations of the eﬃcient level of output from a smooth trend,
as both of these analyses imply, the conventional gap measure is not at all closely related
to variations in the welfare-relevant gap, and a substantial positive response to it — sta-
bilizing the conventional gap but thereby destabilizing the welfare-relevant gap, as well as
inﬂation — can have undesirable consequences from the point of view of the welfare-theoretic
stabilization goals assumed here.15
But even if the rule incorporates the correct implicit inﬂation target and is implemented
using a correct measure of the output gap, there remain disadvantages of the Taylor rule
as a policy prescription. For one, the constrained-optimality of the coeﬃcients in (1.11) is
demonstrated only in the case of a particular speciﬁcation of the real disturbance processes —
only two disturbances, each an AR(1) process with a serial correlation coeﬃcient of exactly
.35. The optimal coeﬃcients are in fact quite sensitive to the assumed degree of persistence
of the disturbances; for example, in the special case that ½r = ½u = ½; they are given by
Á¼ =
·¾
¸i[(1 ¡ ½)(1 ¡ ¯½) ¡ ½·¾]
; Áx =
4¸x¾(1 ¡ ¯½)
¸i[(1 ¡ ½)(1 ¡ ¯½) ¡ ½·¾]
: (1.12)
15See also McCallum (2001) and Woodford (2001) for related discussions, with additional evidence sug-
gesting that conventional and welfare-relevant gap measures may not be at all closely related in historical
time series for the US.
11In the case of our calibrated values for the other parameters, this implies that the optimal
coeﬃcients take the values Á¼ = :96;Áx = :41 if the common ½ is assumed to be as low
as .17, while they instead take unboundedly large values if it is assumed to be as high as
.68.16 Thus this constrained-optimal rule is not robustly optimal in the sense discussed in
Giannoni and Woodford (2002). This makes it an unappealing policy prescription, for in
practice policymakers are not simply likely to doubt whether the assumed values of ½r and
½u correctly represent the typical degree of persistence of disturbances of the two types; they
are instead likely to deny that all such disturbances possess any single degree of persistence,
and thus to remain skeptical about the wisdom of commitment to a rule that is optimal only
if all disturbances are linear combinations of only two types.
Furthermore, even if it is literally true that only two types of disturbances ever occur and
they are correctly described by (1.6) – (1.7), the Taylor rule (1.11) is not a fully optimal rule.
In the best case, it implements the optimal non-inertial plan, but as is shown in Woodford
(1999a), this is not generally the optimal plan. It is possible to do better by committing
to a rule that incorporates an appropriate form of history-dependence. As we shall see,
introducing history-dependence of the right kind can eliminate both of these defects of the
simple Taylor rule.
1.2 A Robustly Optimal Instrument Rule
We turn now to the search for a rule that can instead implement the optimal pattern of
responses to real disturbances. As in Woodford (1999a), the state-contingent plan that
minimizes the objective (1.3) – (1.4) subject to the constraints (1.1) – (1.2) satisﬁes the
ﬁrst-order conditions
¼t ¡ ¯
¡1¾Ξ1t¡1 + Ξ2t ¡ Ξ2t¡1 = 0; (1.13)
16In the case of ½ < :17; the coeﬃcients given by (1.12) cease to imply a determinate equilibrium, as the
“Taylor Principle” ceases to be satisﬁed. In the case of ½ > :68; the denominators of both expressions in
(1.12) become negative, implying Á¼;Áx < 0: While these are possible rules in our discrete-time model, and
even imply a determinate equilibrium as long as ½ < :79; the analysis for this range of parameter values takes
too literally the assumption that all economic decisions are made only at discrete (quarterly) intervals, and
so we choose not to emphasize the possibility of using a Taylor rule to implement the optimal non-inertial
plan in this case.
12¸x(xt ¡ x
¤) + Ξ1t ¡ ¯
¡1Ξ1t¡1 ¡ ·Ξ2t = 0; (1.14)
¸i(it ¡ i
¤) + ¾Ξ1t = 0; (1.15)
for each date t ¸ 0;17 together with the initial conditions
Ξ1;¡1 = Ξ2;¡1 = 0: (1.16)
(Here Ξ1t and Ξ2t are the Lagrange multipliers associated with constraints (1.1) and (1.2)
respectively.) In the case that a bounded optimal plan exists, it can be described by equations
for ¼t;xt;it;Ξ1t and Ξ2t as linear functions of Ξ1;t¡1 and Ξ2;t¡1 together with the current and
expected future values of the exogenous disturbances; these linear equations with constant
coeﬃcients apply in all periods t ¸ 0, starting from the initial conditions (1.16).
It follows from these ﬁrst-order conditions that in the case of an optimal commitment
that has been in force since at least period t ¡ 2, it is possible to infer the values of Ξ1;t¡1
and Ξ2;t¡1 from the values that have been observed for xt¡1;it¡1; and it¡2. Speciﬁcally, one
can infer the value of Ξ1;t¡1 from the value of it¡1 using (1.15), and similarly the value of
Ξ1;t¡2 from the value of it¡2. Then substituting these values into (1.14) for period t¡1, one
can also infer the value of Ξ2;t¡1 from the value of xt¡1. One can, of course, similarly solve
for the period t Lagrange multipliers as functions of xt;it; and it¡1: Using these expressions
to substitute out the Lagrange multipliers in (1.13), one obtains a linear relation among the
endogenous variables ¼t;xt;xt¡1;it;it¡1 and it¡2 that must hold in any period t ¸ 2: This
thus provides a candidate policy rule that is consistent with the optimal state-contingent
plan.
Because the relation in question involves a non-zero coeﬃcient on it, it can be expressed
as an implicit instrument rule of the form
it = (1 ¡ ½1)i
¤ + ½1it¡1 + ½2∆it¡1 + Á¼¼t + Áx∆xt=4; (1.17)
where
½1 = 1 +
·¾
¯
> 1; ½2 = ¯
¡1 > 1; (1.18)








We can furthermore show (see Appendix for proof) that commitment to this rule implies a
determinate equilibrium.
Proposition 6. Suppose that a bounded optimal state-contingent plan exists. Then in
the case of any parameter values ¾;·;¸x;¸i > 0 and 0 < ¯ < 1; a commitment to the rule
described by (1.17) – (1.19) implies a determinate rational-expectations equilibrium.
The equilibrium determined by commitment to this rule from date t = 0 onward corresponds
to the unique bounded solution to equations (1.13) – (1.15) when the initial conditions (1.16)
are replaced by the values of Ξ1;¡1 and Ξ2;¡1 that would be inferred from the historical values
of x¡1;i¡1; and i¡2 under the reasoning described above.
It follows that the equilibrium determined by commitment to the time-invariant instru-
ment rule (1.17) involves the same responses to random shocks in periods t ¸ 0 as under the
optimal commitment. This is thus an example of an instrument rule that is optimal from
a timeless perspective, in the sense deﬁned in Giannoni and Woodford (2002, sec. 3). Note
that we could instead implement precisely the optimal once-and-for-all commitment from
date t = 0 onward (the bounded solution to (1.13) – (1.15) with initial conditions (1.16)) by
committing to (1.17) in all periods t ¸ 2; but to a modiﬁed version of the rule in periods
t = 0 and 1. But this would be a non-time-invariant rule (policy would depend upon the date
relative to the date at which the commitment had been made), and the preferability of this
alternative equilibrium, from the standpoint of expected welfare looking forward from date
t = 0, would result from the alternative policy’s optimal exploitation of prior expectations
that are already given in that period. Choice of a rule that is optimal from a timeless per-
spective requires us to instead commit to set the interest rate according to the time-invariant
rule (1.17) in all periods.
The rule (1.17) has the additional advantage of being robustly optimal, in the sense
deﬁned in Giannoni and Woodford (2002, sec. 4). We note that our derivation of the optimal
14rule has required no hypotheses about the nature of the disturbance processes frn
t ;utg, except
that they are exogenously given and that they are bounded. In fact, the rule is optimal
regardless of their nature; commitment to this rule implies the optimal impulse responses
displayed in Woodford (1999a) in the case of the particular disturbance processes assumed
in the numerical illustrations there, but it equally implies optimal responses in the case of
any other types of disturbances to the natural rate of interest and/or “cost-push shocks” —
disturbances that may be anticipated some quarters in advance, disturbances the eﬀects of
which do not die out monotonically with time, and so on.18 Indeed, one may assume that
both of the disturbances rn
t and ut in equations (1.1) – (1.2) are composite disturbances of
the general form discussed in Giannoni and Woodford (2002, sec. 4), and (1.17) remains an
optimal rule. This robustness of the rule is a strong advantage from the point of view of its
adoption as a practical guide to the conduct of monetary policy.
It is important to note that (1.17) is not a uniquely optimal instrument rule; it is not
even the only rule that is robustly optimal in the sense just discussed. For example, other
rules that are equally consistent with the optimal responses to disturbances, regardless of
the nature of the disturbance processes, may be obtained by substituting for variables in
(1.17) using one or the other of the structural equations (1.1) – (1.2).19 However, alternative
optimal rules derived in this way will not be direct rules, insofar as they will involve feedback
from past, current, or expected future real disturbances as well as from the paths of the
target variables. (One might arrange for the disturbance terms to cancel, under a particular
hypothesis about the statistical properties of the disturbances, but the version of the rule
18This is a substantial advantage of this instrument rule over the one proposed in Woodford (1999a),
which expresses the federal funds rate as a function of the lagged funds rate, the lagged rate of increase in
the funds rate, the current inﬂation rate, and the previous quarter’s inﬂation rate. That rule would also be
consistent with optimal responses to real disturbances, but only if (as assumed in the earlier calculation) all
disturbances perturb the natural rate of interest in a way that can be described by an AR(1) process (1.6)
with a single speciﬁed coeﬃcient of serial correlation, and have no eﬀect on the natural rate of output that
is diﬀerent than the eﬀect on the eﬃcient rate of output (i.e., there are no cost-push shocks). In this special
case, however, the rule discussed earlier has the advantage that its implementation requires no information
on the part of the central bank other than an accurate measure of inﬂation (including an accurate projection
of period t inﬂation at the time that the period t funds rate is set).
19A speciﬁc example: one might use (1.2) to substitute for ¼t in (1.17), and obtain a rule for setting it as
a function of it¡1;it¡2;xt;xt¡1;Et¼t+1; and ut:
15that omitted reference to the disturbances would not be robustly optimal.)
A robustly optimal direct rule must be an implication of the ﬁrst-order conditions (1.13)
– (1.15) only, in order for it not to refer to the structural disturbances; and in order for it not
to refer to the Lagrange multipliers, either, it must in fact be an implication of (1.17). This
still does not make (1.17) the unique such rule. For example, if (1.17) holds in all periods,
it follows that
it = (1 ¡ ½1)(1 ¡ ½3)i
¤ + [½1(1 ¡ ½3) + ½3]it¡1 + (½2 + ½1½3)∆it¡1
¡ ½2½3∆it¡2 + qt ¡ ½3qt¡1 (1.20)
must also hold in all periods, where
qt ´ Á¼¼t + (Áx=4)∆xt (1.21)
and ½3 is an arbitrary coeﬃcient. (This relation is obtained from (1.17) by adding to the
right-hand side ½3 times it¡1 minus the right-hand side at date t ¡ 1.) Condition (1.20) can
also be interpreted as a direct implicit instrument rule, and it too is consistent with the
optimal responses to all real disturbances, regardless of the statistical properties of those
disturbances. Since we know that the rule implies a determinate equilibrium when ½3 = 0;
it follows by continuity that it will also imply a determinate equilibrium for all small enough
½3 6= 0: Hence there exist rules of this form that are also robustly optimal direct instrument
rules. But the additional history-dependence introduced into (1.20) is unnecessary; (1.17)
is unambiguously a simpler rule. The same objection may be raised against the rules with
additional lead terms that can be derived from (1.17) by substituting for some terms using
the conditional expectation at date t of both sides of (1.17) at some future date.
Another relation implied by (1.17) that does not involve a larger number of terms is
it = (½1 + ½2)
¡1[(½1 ¡ 1)i
¤ + Etit+1 + ½2it¡1 ¡ Etqt+1]: (1.22)
(This relation is equivalent to the statement that (1.17) holds at date t+1 only in expectation
conditional upon public information at date t.) This too might conceivably be interpreted as
16an implicit instrument rule for setting it at date t, though in this case a forecast-based rule.
However, while this relation is consistent with the optimal responses to disturbances, impo-
sition of (1.22) as a monetary policy rule does not determine a unique rational-expectations
equilibrium.20 Thus (1.22) — which is implied by but does not imply (1.17) — does not rep-
resent a completely speciﬁed monetary policy rule under the criterion proposed in Giannoni
and Woodford (2002, sec. 2), for it does not imply a determinate state-contingent path for
the central bank’s policy instrument. The same is true a fortiori of the relation that would
be obtained from the conditional expectation at t of (1.17) at t + 2. Thus we conclude that
(1.17) is of unique interest as the simplest possible robustly optimal direct instrument rule,
in the case of our basic neo-Wicksellian model.
The optimal rule (1.17) has a number of important similarities to the Taylor rule. Like
the Taylor rule, (1.17) is an example of a direct, implicit instrument rule. The rule is also
similar to Taylor’s recommendation in that the contemporaneous eﬀect of an increase in
either inﬂation or the output gap upon the federal funds rate operating target is positive
(Á¼;Áx > 0); and the rule satisﬁes the “Taylor principle,” given that Á¼ > 0 and ½1 > 1.21
However, this optimal rule involves additional history-dependence, owing to the non-zero
weights on the lagged funds rate, the lagged rate of increase in the funds rate, and the lagged
output gap. And the optimal degree of history-dependence is non-trivial: the optimal values
of ½1 and ½2 are both necessarily greater than one, while the optimal coeﬃcient on xt¡1 is
as large (in absolute value) as the coeﬃcient on xt: It is particularly worth noting that the
optimal rule implies not only intrinsic inertia in the dynamics of the funds rate — a transitory
deviation of the inﬂation rate from its average value increases the funds rate not only in the
current quarter, but in subsequent quarters as well — but is actually super-inertial: the
20We can easily see this by noting that (1.22) makes it a function of no predetermined state variables
other than it¡1: Hence if this rule did imply a determinate equilibrium, in that equilibrium, ¼t;xt and it
would all be linear functions of it¡1 and the exogenous states that suﬃce to forecast the real disturbances
from period t onward. Yet we know that the optimal responses to shocks generally involve more complex
dependence upon history than can be summarized by a single predetermined variable such as it¡1; for one
cannot generally infer the values of both Ξ1;t¡1 and Ξ2;t¡1 from the value of it¡1 alone. We thus show by
contradiction that (1.22) cannot imply a determinate equilibrium.
21See the discussion in Woodford (2002, chap. 4, sec. 2.2) of the generalization of this principle to the
case of policy rules with interest-rate inertia.
17implied dynamics for the funds rate are explosive,22 if the initial overshooting of the long-
run average inﬂation rate is not oﬀset by a subsequent undershooting (as actually always
happens, in equilibrium). In this respect this optimal rule is similar to those found to be
optimal in the numerical analysis by Rotemberg and Woodford (1999) of a more complicated
empirical version of the model.
In the case of the calibrated parameter values in Table 1 below, the coeﬃcients of the
optimal instrument rule are given by ½1 = 1:15;½2 = 1:01;Á¼ = :64; and Áx = :33: These
may be compared with the coeﬃcients of the Fed reaction function of similar form estimated
by Judd and Rudebusch (1998) for the Greenspan period: ½1 = :73;½2 = :43;Á¼ = :42; and
Áx = :30; except in this empirical reaction function Áx represents the reaction to the current
quarter’s level of the output gap, rather than its ﬁrst diﬀerence.23 (Interestingly, they ﬁnd
that an equation with feedback from the ﬁrst diﬀerence of the output gap, rather than its
level, ﬁts best during an earlier period of Fed policy, under Paul Volcker’s chairmanship.)
The signs of the coeﬃcients of the optimal rule agree with those characterizing actual policy;
in particular, the estimated reaction function includes substantial positive coeﬃcients ½1
and ½2; though these are still not as large as the optimal values. Thus the way in which
actual Fed policy is more complex than adherence to a simple Taylor rule can largely be
justiﬁed as movement in the direction of optimal policy, according to the simple model of
the transmission mechanism assumed here.
We ﬁnd that in the case of this simple model at least, it is not necessary for the central
bank’s operating target for the overnight interest rate to respond to forecasts of the future
evolution of inﬂation or of the output gap in order for policy to be fully optimal — and not
just optimal in the case of particular assumed stochastic processes for the disturbances, but
22Technically, this corresponds to the observation that in the equivalent representation (1.23) of the policy
rule given below, there exists a root ¸2 > 1: A suﬃcient condition for this is that ½1 > 1; in which case
exactly one of the roots is greater than 1.
23It should also be noted that the output gap measure used in Judd and Rudebusch’s empirical analysis,
while a plausible measure of what the Fed is likely to have responded to, may not correspond to the welfare-
relevant output gap indicated by the variable xt in the optimal rule (1.17). In addition, Á¼ indicates response
to the most recent four-quarter growth in the GDP deﬂator, rather than an annualized inﬂation rate over
the past quarter alone.
18robustly optimal. Thus the mere fact that the central bank may sometimes have information
about future disturbances, that are not in any way disturbing demand or supply conditions
yet, is not a reason for feedback from current and past values of the target variables to be
insuﬃcient as a basis for optimal policy. This does not mean that it may not be desirable
for monetary policy to restrain spending and/or price increases even before the anticipated
real disturbances actually take eﬀect. But in the context of a forward-looking model of
private-sector behavior, a commitment to respond to ﬂuctuations in the target variables
only contemporaneously and later does not preclude eﬀective pre-emptive constraint of that
kind. First of all, such a policy may well mean that the central bank does adjust its policy
instrument immediately in response to the news, insofar as forward-looking private-sector
behavior may result in an immediate eﬀect of the news upon current inﬂation and output.24
And more importantly, in the presence of forward-looking private-sector behavior, the central
bank mainly aﬀects the economy through changes in expectations about the future path
of its instrument in any event; a predictable adjustment of interest rates later, once the
disturbances substantially aﬀect inﬂation and output, should be just as eﬀective in restraining
private-sector spending and pricing decisions as a preemptive increase in overnight interest
rates immediately.
At the same time, it is important to note that the optimal rule (1.17), while not “forecast-
based” in the sense in which this term is usually understood, does depend upon projections
of inﬂation and output in the same quarter as the one for which the operating target is being
set. Thus the rule is not an explicit instrument rule in the sense of Svensson and Woodford
(1999). And this implicit character (a feature that it shares with the Taylor rule) is crucial
to the optimality of the rule, at least if we wish to ﬁnd an optimal rule that is also a direct
rule (specifying feedback only from the target variables). For optimal policy must generally
involve an immediate adjustment of the short-term nominal interest rate in response to
shocks, as shown in Woodford (1999a);25 and so unless the rule is to be speciﬁed in terms of
24This is obviously not the case if, as more realistic models often assume, there are delays in the eﬀect
of any new information on prices and spending. But in this case, it is probably not desirable for overnight
interest rates to respond immediately to news, either; see section 3.2 below.
19the central bank’s response to particular shocks, it will have to specify a contemporaneous
response to ﬂuctuations in the target variables, and not simply a lagged response. Thus
implementation of such a rule will involve judgment of some sophistication about current
conditions; it cannot be implemented mechanically on the basis of a small number of publicly
available statistics.
1.3 A Robustly Optimal Targeting Rule
We have just seen that policy need not be forecast-based in order to be optimal, and even
robustly optimal. At the same time, this does not mean that a forecast-based decision
procedure cannot have equally desirable properties. In fact, the policy rule just discussed
is equivalent, in a certain sense, to a forecast-based rule. This alternative representation
of optimal policy is also of interest as an example of a robustly optimal policy rule that
takes the form of a (pure) targeting rule, rather than as an expression that presents, even
implicitly, a formula for the bank’s interest-rate operating target.26
We can write the implicit instrument rule (1.17) in the form
(1 ¡ ¸1L)(1 ¡ ¸2L)ˆ {t = ˆ qt; (1.23)
where ˆ {t ´ it ¡ ¯ {, and ˆ qt similarly denotes the deviation of qt (the function of the target
variables to which the central bank responds, deﬁned in (1.21)) from its long-run average
value, Á¼¯ ¼. Because the optimal coeﬃcients (1.18) are such that ½1 > 1;½2 > 0; the roots
in the factorization (1.23) necessarily satisfy 0 < ¸1 < 1 < ¸2: It then follows that relation
25This is not true if there are delays in the eﬀects of shocks upon inﬂation and output, as discussed in
section 3.2 below. But in that case, even the delayed eﬀect upon the central bank’s instrument that is
required by optimal policy cannot be implemented on the basis only of lagged observations of the target
variables, because of the delay with which shocks aﬀect these variables.
26Svensson (1999) uses the concept of a “targeting rule” somewhat more broadly, to include the possibility
of target criteria which may or may not depend on interest rates. Hence there is no sharp distinction
between targeting rules and implicit instrument rules of the kind discussed in the previous section. We ﬁnd
it of interest, however, that optimal policy admits of alternative representations in this case, in only one
of which the rule can be written as an implicit instrument rule; in the case that no such interpretation is
possible, we refer to a pure targeting rule. The two alternative representations of optimal policy can also be
distinguished in terms of the degree of forward integration of the target criterion.
20(1.17) is equivalent to the relation
(1 ¡ ¸1L)ˆ {t¡1 = ¡¸
¡1





in the following sense.
Proposition 7. Two bounded stochastic processes fˆ {t; ˆ qtg satisfy (1.23) for all t ¸ 0 if
and only if they satisfy (1.24) for all t ¸ 0:
(See proof in the Appendix.)
Thus there is no diﬀerence between the way in which a central bank must adjust its
interest-rate instrument to ensure that (1.17) holds in all periods and the way that it would
adjust it to ensure that (1.24) holds in all periods, for the two conditions imply one another.
(This does not mean that arranging for (1.24) to hold in a single period t is equivalent to
arranging for (1.17) to hold in that single period, regardless of how policy is expected to be
conducted thereafter; but a permanent commitment to either rule from some date t0 onward
has identical consequences.) This equivalence does not apply only in the case of processes
that are possible equilibria of the model consisting of structural equations (1.1) – (1.2);
thus the rules are equivalent regardless of whether that model is correctly speciﬁed, and
regardless of whether the central bank expects the economy to actually evolve according to
a rational-expectations equilibrium of that model or not (for example, regardless of whether
the private sector is believed to correctly understand the bank’s policy rule or not).
It follows from this equivalence that a commitment to ensure that (1.24) holds in all
periods from some date onward represents a coherent complete speciﬁcation of a monetary
policy rule, at least in the context of the model described by equations (1.1) – (1.2). Hence
this represents a well-deﬁned targeting rule, even though the criterion (1.22) cannot be solved
by itself to yield even an implicit expression for the period t instrument setting: the left-hand
side involves only lagged interest rates, while the right-hand side refers only to the evolution
of inﬂation and the output gap. A model of the monetary transmission mechanism must be
used in order to determine the instrument setting that is consistent with a projection that
21satisﬁes the target criterion.27







xt¡1 ¡ µi(it¡1 ¡ i
¤) ¡ µ∆∆it¡1; (1.25)





involving weights f®z;jg that sum to one. Thus the criterion speciﬁes a time-varying target
value for a weighted average of an inﬂation forecast and an output-gap forecast, where each
of these forecasts is in fact a weighted average of forecasts at various horizons, rather than
a projection for a speciﬁc future date. The rule represents a variant of what Svensson
(1999) calls “ﬂexible inﬂation targeting,” though this rule diﬀers from simple versions that
Svensson discusses in the history-dependence of the inﬂation-forecast target (indicated by
the non-constant terms on the right-hand side).
In representation (1.25) of this policy rule, there is no constant term, indicating an
inﬂation-forecast target of zero except insofar as this is corrected in response to deviations
(past or projected) of the output gap and/or the nominal interest rate from their target
values.28 The optimal coeﬃcients indicating the degree to which the inﬂation-forecast target
is adjusted are given by


















27Note, however, that the situation is not really diﬀerent in the case of a commitment to ensure that (1.17)
is satisﬁed: a model is still needed to determine the instrument setting that should result in current period
inﬂation and output that imply that the implicit instrument rule is satisﬁed.
28Note, however, that this does not mean that the rule sets the inﬂation forecast equal to zero on average.
This is because the target interest rate i¤ is in general not consistent with an average inﬂation rate of zero.
22while the optimal weights in the conditional forecasts are





Thus the optimal conditional forecast is one that places positive weight on the projection for
each future period, beginning with the current period, with weights that decline exponentially
as the horizon increases. The mean distance in the future of the projections that are relevant
to the target criterion is equal to
1 X
j=0
®z;jj = (¸2 ¡ 1)
¡1
for both the inﬂation and output-gap forecasts.
In the case of the calibrated parameter values reported in Table 1, the rate at which these
weights decay per quarter is ¸
¡1
2 = :68, so that the mean forecast horizon in the optimal
target criterion is 2.1 quarters. Thus while our optimal example of a pure targeting rule
can be expressed in terms of a target for inﬂation and output-gap forecasts, the forecast
horizon involved is short compared to those typically considered in the recent literature, or
those typical of the actual practice of inﬂation forecast-targeting central banks. For these
same parameter values, the optimal relative weight on the output-gap forecast is Áx = :15;
indicating that the target criterion is essentially an inﬂation-forecast target, albeit a modiﬁed
one. The direction of modiﬁcation is the one suggested by Svensson (1997, 1999): a forecast
of a lower output gap than normal should cause the central bank to tolerate a higher than
average inﬂation forecast. Finally, the remaining optimal coeﬃcients are µx = :15;µi = :24;
and µ∆ = :51; indicating a substantial degree of history-dependence of the optimal modiﬁed
inﬂation-forecast target. The fact that µx = Áx indicates that it is really the forecasted
increase in the output gap relative to the previous quarter’s level, rather than the absolute
level of the gap, that should modify the inﬂation-forecast target. The signs of µi and µ∆
imply that policy will be made tighter (in the sense of demanding a lower modiﬁed inﬂation
forecast) when interest rates have been high and/or increasing in the recent past; this is
another way of committing to interest-rate inertia of the kind discussed above.
23The equivalence expressed in Proposition 7 implies that commitment to a history-dependent
modiﬁed inﬂation-forecast target of this kind is a robustly optimal policy rule in exactly the
same sense as the instrument rule (1.17). Thus commitment to a pure targeting rule can be a
sound approach to policy. This alternative, forward-integrated representation of optimal pol-
icy has the possible advantage (from the point of view of successfully steering private-sector
expectations) of emphasizing the way in which the outlook for inﬂation and the output gap
are adjusted at each point in time (at least as far as the intentions of the central bank are
concerned) in response to variations in the recent evolution of the target variables. While this
is implied by a commitment to implement the instrument rule (1.17) from now on, it might
not be clear to the private sector — for example, because the central bank’s commitment
to continue to implement the instrument rule in the future might not be clear. Hence com-
munication with the public about current policy decisions in terms of their implications for
inﬂation and output-gap forecasts might be a superior way of conveying the central bank’s
commitments with regard to subsequent developments.
The representation of optimal policy in terms of a pure targeting rule also has the ad-
vantage of continuing to be possible even in the limiting case that ¸i = 0; i.e., even when
reducing the variability of interest rates is not an independent concern.29 In that limit, the
weights Á¼ and Áx in (1.17) become unboundedly large, so that a representation of optimal
policy in terms of a direct instrument rule ceases to be possible. Instead, the coeﬃcients of
(1.25) remain well-deﬁned: µi and µ∆ become equal to zero, while Áx;µx; and the weights
f®z;jg continue to take well-deﬁned positive values. Thus in this limiting case, the optimal
targeting rule is one in which the inﬂation-forecast target must be modiﬁed in proportion to
the projected change in the output gap, but it is no longer also dependent on lagged interest
rates.
29Svensson and Woodford (1999) consider a model closely related to this one, but assume a stabilization
objective in which ¸i = 0. It is for this reason that they ﬁnd that it is possible to formulate a robustly
optimal targeting rule, a forward-looking variant of (1.26) below, but not a robustly optimal instrument
rule.
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where P ¤ is a target price level.30 Thus optimal policy in this can be implemented by com-
mitment to a target of the sort proposed by Hall (1984), though the optimal weight Áx
implied by our theory is considerably smaller (for any plausible calibration of the model’s
parameters) than the values suggested by Hall. Furthermore, such a policy may be imple-
mented through a forecast-targeting procedure of the kind practiced by inﬂation-targeting
central banks, rather than necessarily requiring institution of the sort of automatic mecha-
nism proposed by Hall.
2 Optimal Rules for a Model with Inﬂation Inertia
The basic model considered above is often criticized as being excessively forward-looking,
particularly in its neglect of any sources of intrinsic inertia in the dynamics of inﬂation. It
might be suspected that this feature of the model is responsible for our strong conclusion
above, according to which a robustly optimal policy rule need involve no dependence upon
forecasts of the target variables beyond the current period. In Svensson’s (1997) classic
argument for the optimality of inﬂation-forecast targeting, it is the existence of lags in
the eﬀect of monetary policy on inﬂation that causes the optimal rule to involve a target
criterion for a forecast, with the optimal forecast horizon coinciding with the length of the
policy transmission lag. It might reasonably be suspected that forecasts are not necessary
in our analysis above because our simple model includes no lags in the eﬀects of policy.
30See Woodford (1999b) for further discussion. Even when ¸i > 0; “Wicksellian” rules, in which the
nominal interest rate is adjusted in response to deviations of the price level from a deterministic target
path, rather than to deviations of inﬂation from a target rate as in the Taylor rule, maybe be desirable by
comparison with other equally simple rules, as shown by Giannoni (2001).
25Here we take up this question by extending our analysis to the case of the model of
inﬂation inertia developed in Woodford (2002, chap. 3). In this extension of our basic
model, prices are not held constant between the dates at which they are re-optimized, but
instead are automatically adjusted on the basis of the most recent quarter’s increase in the
aggregate price index, by a percentage that is a fraction ° of the percentage increase in the
index.31 The aggregate supply relation (1.2) then takes the more general form
¼t ¡ °¼t¡1 = ·xt + ¯Et(¼t+1 ¡ °¼t) + ut; (2.1)
where the coeﬃcient · and the disturbance ut are deﬁned as before. For ° substantially
greater than zero, this makes past inﬂation an important determinant of current inﬂation,
along with current and expected future output gaps and cost-push shocks; if ° is close enough
to one, even a monetary disturbance that has only a transitory eﬀect on real activity can
have a much longer-lasting eﬀect on inﬂation.
The aggregate-demand side of our model remains as before, and our model can accord-
ingly be summarized by the two structural equations (1.1) and (2.1), together with exogenous
stochastic processes for the disturbances frn
t ;utg. As shown in Woodford (2002, chap. 6),
the change in our assumptions about pricing behavior implies a corresponding change in the
appropriate welfare-theoretic stabilization objective for monetary policy. This is once again
a discounted criterion of the form (1.3), but the period loss function becomes
Lt = (¼t ¡ °¼t¡1)
2 + ¸x(xt ¡ x
¤)
2 + ¸i(it ¡ i
¤)
2: (2.2)
We wish to consider policies that minimize the criterion deﬁned by (1.3) and (2.2), subject
to the constraints imposed by the structural equations (1.1) and (2.1), for arbitrary values
of the indexation parameter 0 · ° · 1:32
31Indexation of this kind was ﬁrst proposed by Christiano et al. (2001), and has since been incorporated
into estimated models of wage and price dynamics by Altig et al. (2002), Smets and Wouters (2002), and
Sbordone (2002b).
32An alternative way of modeling inﬂation inertia would be to assume the existence of backward-looking
“rule of thumb” price-setters, as in Gali and Gertler (1999). This leads to a modiﬁcation of the aggregate
supply relation that is similar, though not quite identical, to (2.1). Steinsson (2000) and Amato and Laubach
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t ´ ¼t ¡ °¼t¡1 (2.4)
is the quasi-diﬀerenced inﬂation rate that appears in both the aggregate supply relation
(2.1) and the loss function (2.2). Conditions (1.14) – (1.15) remain as before, and this
system of three equations, together with initial conditions (1.16) and an initial condition for
¼¡1; continues to deﬁne the optimal once-and-for-all commitment to apply from date t = 0
onward.
As above, we can use conditions (1.14) – (1.15) to substitute for Ξ1t and Ξ2t in (2.3),
obtaining an Euler equation of the form
Et[A(L)(it+1 ¡ i
¤)] = ¡ft (2.5)
for the optimal evolution of the target variables. Here A(L) is a cubic lag polynomial





while the term ft is a function of the observed and expected future paths of the target
variables, deﬁned by













(Note that the above deﬁnition generalizes the earlier (1.21), and that in the limit where
° = 0; ft is equal to ˜ qt; which equals qt:)
(2001b) derive welfare-theoretic loss functions for this model, and ﬁnd that the loss each period is a quadratic
function of both ¼t and ¼t¡1 that is similar, though again not identical, to our loss function (2.2). Hence
we conjecture that similar conclusions as to the degree to which optimal policy is forward-looking would be
obtained using the Gali-Gertler model, though we do not take this up here.
27By an argument directly analogous to the proof of Proposition 6, we can show that if
a bounded optimal state-contingent plan exists, the system obtained by adjoining (2.5) to
the structural equations (1.1) and (2.1) implies a determinate rational-expectations equilib-
rium, in which the responses to exogenous disturbances are the same as under the optimal
commitment. (The only diﬀerence between this equilibrium and the optimal once-and-for-all
commitment just deﬁned relates to the initial conditions, as in our earlier discussion, and
once again this diﬀerence is irrelevant to the design of a policy rule that is optimal from
a timeless perspective.) Hence we could regard (2.5) as implicitly deﬁning a policy rule,
and the rule would once again be robustly optimal. In the limiting case that ° = 0; (2.5)
ceases to involve any dependence upon Etit+1; and the proposed rule would coincide with
the optimal instrument rule (1.17) discussed above.
However, (2.5) is an even less explicit expression for the central bank’s interest-rate
policy than the implicit instrument rules considered earlier, for (when ° > 0) it deﬁnes it
only as a function of Etit+1: This means that the central bank deﬁnes the way in which it is
committed to set its instrument only as a function of the way that it expects to act further
in the future. This failure to express the rule in “closed form” is especially undesirable from
the point of view of our question about the optimal forecast horizon for a monetary policy
rule. Expression (2.5) involves no conditional expectations for variables at dates more than
one period in the future. However, this does not really mean that the central bank’s forecasts
for later dates are irrelevant when setting it. For this “rule” directs the bank to set it as a
function of its forecast of it+1; and (if the same rule is expected to be used to set it+1) the
bank’s forecast at t of it+1 should involve its forecast at t of ˜ qt+2. It should also involve its
forecast of it+2, and hence (by similar reasoning) its forecast of ˜ qt+3; and so on. Hence it is
more revealing to describe the proposed policy rule in a form that eliminates any reference to
the future path of interest rates themselves, and instead refers only to the bank’s projections
of the future paths of inﬂation and the output gap.33
33A rule expressed in this way will also conform better to the evident preference of central bank’s to
justify their monetary policy decisions to the public in terms of their projections for the future paths of
inﬂation and output, rather than in terms of their assumptions about the future path of interest rates.
28To obtain an equivalent policy rule of the desired form, we need to partially “solve
forward” equation (2.5). This requires factorization of the lag polynomial as
A(L) ´ ¯°(1 ¡ ¸1L)(1 ¡ ¸2L)(1 ¡ ¸3L): (2.9)
We note the following properties of the roots of the associated characteristic equation.
Proposition 8. Suppose that ¾;· > 0;0 < ¯ < 1; and 0 < ° · 1: Then in the
factorization (2.9) of the polynomial deﬁned in (2.6), there is necessarily one real root 0 <
¸1 < 1; and two roots outside the unit circle. The latter two roots are either two real roots
¸3 ¸ ¸2 > 1; or a complex pair ¸2;¸3 of roots with real part greater than 1. Three real roots
necessarily exist for all small enough ° > 0; while a complex pair necessarily exists for all °
close enough to 1.
(See proof in the Appendix.) We use the conventions in the statement of this proposition in
referring to the distinct roots in what follows. It is also useful to rewrite (2.5) as
Et[A(L)ˆ {t+1] = ¡ ˆ ft; (2.10)
where once again hats denote the deviations of the original variables from the long-run
average values implied by the policy rule (2.5), or equivalently, by the optimal commitment.
In the case that three real roots exist, the existence of two distinct roots greater than
one allows us two distinct ways of “solving forward”, resulting in two alternative relations,





¡1 ˆ ft]; (2.11)
Public communications such as the Bank of England’s Inﬂation Report put projections for both inﬂation
and output at center stage, while being careful not to express any opinion whatsoever about the likely path
of interest rates over the period under discussion. The forecast-based rules proposed below still refer to
forecast paths conditional upon intended policy, rather than upon “constant-interest-rate” forecasts, and
so it will not be possible to implement these rules without taking a stand (at least for internal purposes)
on the likely future path of interest rates. But the rules make it possible to discuss the way in which the
current instrument setting is required by the bank’s inﬂation and output projections, without also discussing
the interest-rate path that is implicit in those projections, and to this extent they require a less radical
modiﬁcation of current procedures.
29or





¡1 ˆ ft]: (2.12)
We can also derive other relations of the same form by taking linear combinations of these

























¡1 ˆ ft]: (2.13)
Here relations (2.11) and (2.12) are deﬁned (with real-valued coeﬃcients) only in the case
that three real roots exist, while relation (2.13) can also be derived (and has real coeﬃcients
on all leads and lags) in the case that ¸2;¸3 are a complex pair. Because j¸2j;j¸3j > 1;
the right-hand side of each of these expressions is well-deﬁned, and describes a bounded
stochastic process in the case of any bounded process f ˆ ftg. (In what follows, we shall refer
to the three possible expressions for an optimal instrument rule presented in (2.11) – (2.13)
as Rule I, Rule II, and Rule III respectively.)
Each of the relations (2.11) – (2.13) can be solved for ˆ {t as a function of two of its own
lags and expectations at date t regarding current and future values of ˆ ft: These can thus be
interpreted as implicit instrument rules, each of which now avoids any direct reference to
the planned future path of the central bank’s instrument (though assumptions about future
monetary policy will be implicit in the inﬂation and output-gap forecasts). Each of these
policy rules is equivalent to (2.5), and they are accordingly equivalent to one another, in the
following sense.
Proposition 9. Under the assumptions of Proposition 8, and in the case that the
factorization (2.9) involves three real roots, a pair of bounded processes fˆ {t; ˆ ftg satisfy any
of the equations (2.11), (2.12) or (2.13) at all dates t ¸ t0 if and only if they satisfy (2.10)
at all of those same dates. In the case that a complex pair exists, (2.13) is again equivalent
to (2.10), in the same sense.
30(See proof in Appendix.) Each of the rules thus represents a feasible speciﬁcation of mone-
tary policy in the case that its coeﬃcients are real-valued, and when this is true it implies
equilibrium responses to real disturbances that are those associated with an optimal com-
mitment. Accordingly, each represents an optimal policy rule from a timeless perspective.
(Note that although the coeﬃcients diﬀer, these are not really diﬀerent policies. Proposi-
tion 9 implies that they involve identical actions, if the bank expects to follow one of them
indeﬁnitely, regardless of the model of the economy used to form the conditional forecasts.)
In the case that three real roots exist, we have a choice of representations of optimal
policy in terms of an instrument rule, and this time we cannot choose among them on
grounds of simplicity. But rule I seems particularly appealing in this case. This is the
rule (among our three possibilities, or any other linear combinations of these) that puts the
least weight on forecasts far in the future. It is proper to ask at what rate the weights on
forecasts shrink with the forecast horizon, under the assumption that these shrink as fast as
possible consistent with robust optimality of the policy rule, if we wish to determine how
much forecast-dependence is necessary for robust optimality. This choice is also uniquely
desirable in the sense that it remains well-deﬁned in the limit as ° approaches zero. In this
limit, rule I reduces to
(1 ¡ ¸1L)(1 ¡ ¸2L)ˆ {t = ˆ ft;
which is the optimal instrument rule (1.23) derived earlier.34 Instead, in the case of any
of the other rules, the coeﬃcients on lagged interest rates become unboundedly large as °
approaches zero. Thus rule I is clearly the preferable speciﬁcation of policy in the case of
small °. The desire for a rule that varies continuously with °, so that uncertainty about the
precise value of ° will not imply any great uncertainty about how to proceed, then make
rule I an appealing choice over the entire range of ° for which it is deﬁned.
One might think that the same continuity argument could instead be used to argue for
34Note that as ° ! 0; ¸3 ! +1; while °¸3 ! ¯
¡1: Recall also that in this limiting case, ˆ ft = ˆ qt: One
can show furthermore that the two smaller roots ¸1;¸2 in the factorization (2.9) approach the two roots in
the factorization (1.23) of our earlier quadratic lag polynomial.
31the choice of rule III in all cases, since this is the only one of our optimal instrument rules
that continues to be deﬁned for high values of °: Yet the instruction to follow rule I if three
real roots exist, but rule III if there is a complex pair, is also a speciﬁcation that makes
all coeﬃcients of the policy rule continuous functions of °. The reason is that as ° passes
through a critical value ¯ ° at which the real roots of the characteristic equation bifurcate, the
two larger real roots, ¸2 and ¸3, come to exactly equal one another. When ¯ ° is approached
from the other direction, the imaginary parts of the complex roots ¸2 and ¸3 approach zero;
at the bifurcation point their common real value is the repeated real root obtained as the
common limit of the two real roots from the other direction. Hence when ° = ¯ °; rules I, II,
and III are all identical. There is thus no ambiguity about whether rule I or rule III should
be applied in this case, and no discontinuity in the coeﬃcients of the recommended rule as
° approaches ¯ ° from either direction. At the same time, this proposal results in a rule that
remains well-deﬁned as ° approaches zero, and for small ° > 0 results in a rule that is very
close to the one previously recommended for an economy with no inﬂation inertia.
Each of rules I, II, and III can be written in the form
it = (1 ¡ ½1)i
¤ + ½1it¡1 + ½2∆it¡1 + Á¼Ft(¼) +
Áx
4




where here we have added the constant terms again to indicate the desired level of interest
rates (and not just the interest rate relative to its long-run average level), and where Ft(z)
again denotes a linear combination of forecasts of the variable z at various future horizons,
with weights normalized to sum to one. This form of rule generalizes the speciﬁcation (1.17)
that suﬃces in the case ° = 0 in two respects: the interest-rate operating target it now
depends upon lagged inﬂation in addition to the lagged variables that mattered before, and
it now depends upon forecasts of inﬂation and the output gap in future periods, and not
simply upon the projections of those variables for the current period.
Except in these respects, the coeﬃcients are qualitatively similar to those in (1.17), as
indicated by the following proposition.
Proposition 10. Under the assumptions of Proposition 8, and a loss function with










¸x;¸i > 0, each of rules I, II, and III has a representation of the form (2.14) for all values of
° for which the rule is well-deﬁned, and in this representation,
½1 > 1; ½2 > 0;
0 < µ¼ · Á¼;
and
0 < µx = Áx:
Furthermore, for given values of the other parameters, as ° ! 0 (for rule I) the coeﬃcient
µ¼ approaches zero, though Á¼ approaches a positive limit; while as ° ! 1 (for rule III) the
coeﬃcients µ¼ and Á¼ approach the same positive limit.
(The proof is again in the Appendix.) It is especially noteworthy that once again the optimal
instrument rule is superinertial. We also note that once again what should matter is the
projected output gap relative to the previous quarter’s output gap, rather than the absolute
level of the projected gap; and once again interest rates should be increased if the gap is
projected to rise. Once again a higher projected inﬂation rate implies that the interest rate
should be increased; but now the degree to which this is true is lower if recent inﬂation has
been high, and in the extreme case ° = 1; it is only the projected inﬂation rate relative to
the previous quarter’s rate that should matter.




















































Figure 1: Coeﬃcients of the optimal instrument rule (2.14) as functions of °:
























rule I, g = 0.1 
rule I, g = 0.3 
rule III, g = 0.5 
rule III, g = 1  
Figure 2: Relative weights on forecasts at diﬀerent horizons in the optimal rule (2.14).
The numerical values of these coeﬃcients are plotted, for alternative values of ° ranging
between zero and one, in the various panels of Figure 1, where the assumed values for the
other parameters are as in Table 1. For all values ° < ¯ ° = :35; there are three real roots, and
for each value of ° the three values corresponding to rules I, II, and III are each plotted; for
° > ¯ °; only rule III is deﬁned. An interesting feature of these plots, is that if one considers
the coeﬃcients associated with rule I for ° · ¯ ° and rule III for ° ¸ ¯ °; one observes that the
magnitude of each of the coeﬃcients remains roughly the same, regardless of the assumed
value of °: (The exception is µ¼, which approaches zero for small °; but becomes a substantial
positive coeﬃcient for large °; as indicated by Proposition 10.)
The panels of Figure 2 similarly plot the relative weights ®z;j=®z;0 for diﬀerent horizons
j of the inﬂation and output-gap forecasts to which the optimal instrument rule refers,35 for
35Here we plot the relative weights, rather than the absolute weights, because this makes visual comparison
between the degree of forecast-dependence of optimal policy in the diﬀerent cases easier. The absolute weights
can be recovered by integrating the plots shown here, since the relative weights in each case must sum to
35each of several diﬀerent possible values of °: (The weights associated with rule I are plotted
in the case of values ° < ¯ °; and those associated with rule III in the case of values ° > ¯ °:)
Here we observe that in this case the forecasts Ft(z) are not actually weighted averages of
forecasts at diﬀerent horizons, because the weights are not all non-negative. Thus while
in the presence of inﬂation inertia, the optimal instrument rule is to some extent forecast-
based, the optimal responses to forecasts of future inﬂation and output gaps are not of the
sort generally assumed in forward-looking variants of the Taylor rule. In the case of high °; a
higher forecasted inﬂation rate (or output gap) in any of the next several quarters implies, for
given past and projected current conditions, that a lower current interest rate is appropriate.
According to the optimal rule, a higher current inﬂation rate should be tolerated in the case
that high inﬂation is forecast for the next several quarters. This is because (in an economy
with ° near one) it is sudden changes in the inﬂation rate that creates the greatest distortions
in the economy, by making automatic adjustment of prices in response to lagged inﬂation a
poor rule of thumb.
In addition to this diﬀerence from the conventional wisdom with respect to the sign with
which forecasts should aﬀect policy, one notes that under the optimal rule it is only forecasts
regarding the near future that matter much at all. Even if we consider only the weights put








is equal to only 2.2 quarters in the case of our calibrated example with ° = 1: Thus forecasts
other than for the ﬁrst year following the current quarter matter little under the optimal
policy. Even more notably, none of the projections beyond the current quarter should receive




is equal to only 0.39 even in the extreme case ° = 1; while this fraction falls to zero for
1=®z;0:
36small °: Thus while a robustly optimal direct instrument rule does have to be forecast-based
in the presence of inﬂation inertia, the degree to which forecasts matter under the optimal
policy rule is still relatively small. Instead, a strong response to projections of inﬂation and
the output gap for the current period, as called for by the Taylor rule, continues to be the
crucial element of optimal policy.
2.2 A Robustly Optimal Targeting Rule
The presence of two roots outside the unit circle in the factorization (2.9) suggests that we
ought to solve both of them forward, rather than only one. (This would eliminate the ambi-
guity about which one to solve forward, that required us to choose between representations
(2.11) and (2.12) of optimal policy. Solving both roots forward, we obtain instead a relation
of the form









¡1 ˆ ft]: (2.15)
Once again, this relation can be shown to be equivalent to the Euler equation (2.5).
Proposition 11. Under the assumptions of Proposition 8, a pair of bounded processes
fˆ {t; ˆ ftg satisfy (2.15) at all dates t ¸ t0 if and only if they satisfy (2.10) at all of those same
dates.
(See proof in the Appendix.) And an advantage of solving both roots forward is that this
relation, unlike either (2.11) or (2.12), has real coeﬃcients for all leads and lags, whether or
not there are complex roots.
However, this relation diﬀers from any of the relations (2.11) – (2.13) in that it does not
involve ˆ {t: Thus it represents a pure targeting rule, one that cannot be interpreted as an
instrument rule. However, it follows from Proposition 8 that a commitment to adjust the
short-term nominal interest rate so as to achieve a situation in which the bank’s projections
satisfy (2.15) represents a well-deﬁned policy rule, and one that is furthermore equivalent
to any of the three instrument rules discussed in the previous section (if these are deﬁned).
37Hence this provides a relatively simple example of a robustly optimal pure targeting rule,
for the case of an economy with inﬂation inertia.




Ft(x) = µ¼¼t¡1 +
µx
4
xt¡1 ¡ µi(it¡1 ¡ i
¤) ¡ µ∆∆it¡1; (2.16)
generalizing (1.25). Note that the only diﬀerence as to the general form of this targeting rule
is the presence of the term indicating dependence of the modiﬁed inﬂation-forecast target
on lagged inﬂation ¼t¡1. One can also establish the following properties of the optimal
coeﬃcients, generalizing our previous results.
Proposition 12. Under the assumptions of Proposition 10, the optimal targeting cri-
terion has a representation (2.16) in which
Áx = µx > 0;
0 < µ¼ · 1;
and
µi; µ∆ > 0:
Furthermore, for ﬁxed values of the other parameters, as ° ! 0; µ¼ approaches zero and the
other parameters approach the non-zero values associated with the target criterion (1.25).
Instead, as ° ! 1; µ¼ approaches 1.
(Again, the proof is in the Appendix.)
Once again, the optimal inﬂation-forecast target must be modiﬁed in response to vari-
ations in the output-gap projection; a higher inﬂation-forecast target is appropriate if the
output gap is projected to fall relative to its recent past level. And once again the optimal
inﬂation-forecast target must be history-dependent, not only because the output-gap mod-
iﬁcation just mentioned depends upon the relation between the output-gap projections for





































Figure 3: Coeﬃcients of the optimal targeting rule (2.16) as functions of °.
current and future periods relative to a past level, but because the appropriate inﬂation-
forecast target is lower if nominal interest rates have been high and/or increasing in the
recent past.
The additional presence of a coeﬃcient µ¼ > 0 when ° > 0 indicates that the modiﬁed
inﬂation-forecast target should be higher when recent inﬂation has been higher; this makes
sense given that the distortions associated with inﬂation variations are greater the greater
the departure of the current inﬂation rate from the rate of automatic price adjustment in
response to lagged inﬂation. In the extreme case ° = 1; the inﬂation-forecast target is
adjusted one hundred percent in response to variations in the recent rate of inﬂation, since
in this case it is actually the rate of change in inﬂation that one wants to stabilize.
Each of the coeﬃcients in (2.16) is plotted as a function of ° in Figure 3, assuming the
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g = 0.5 
g = 1  
Figure 4: Relative weights on forecasts at diﬀerent horizons in the optimal rule (2.16).
same calibrated values for the other parameters as before. (There are this time no separate
plots for µx and Áx; as these coeﬃcients are necessarily identical.) An interesting feature of
these results is that each of the coeﬃcients indicating history-dependence (µ¼;µx;µi; and µ∆)
increases with °. Thus if there is substantial inﬂation inertia, it is even more important for
the inﬂation-forecast target to vary with changes in recent economic conditions. It is also
worth noting that the degree to which the inﬂation-forecast target should be modiﬁed in
response to changes in the output-gap projection (indicated by the coeﬃcient Áx) increases
with °: While our conclusion for the baseline model (an optimal targeting rule with Áx = :15)
might have suggested that this sort of modiﬁcation of the inﬂation-forecast target is not too
important, we ﬁnd that a substantially larger response is justiﬁed if ° is large (the optimal
Áx approaches the value 0.51 for ° = 1).
The panels of Figure 4 correspondingly show the relative weights ®z;j=®z;0 on the forecasts
at diﬀerent horizons in the optimal target criterion (2.16), for each of several alternative
40values of °: As before, this representation of optimal policy is more forward-looking than
is the optimal instrument rule; we now ﬁnd, at least for high enough values of °; that the
optimal target criterion places non-negligible weight on forecasts more than a year in the
future. But it is not necessarily true that a greater degree of inﬂation inertia justiﬁes a target
criterion that with a longer forecast horizon. Increases in ° increase the optimal weights on
the current-quarter projections of both inﬂation and the output gap (normalizing the weights
to sum to one), and instead make the weights on the projections for quarters more than two
quarters in the future less positive. At least for low values of ° (in which case the weights
are all non-negative), this makes the optimal target criterion less forward-looking. For high
values of °; increases in ° do increase the absolute value of the weights on forecasts for dates
one to two years in the future (these become more negative). But even in this case, the
existence of inﬂation inertia does not justify the kind of response to longer-horizon forecasts
that is typical of inﬂation-forecast targeting central banks. An increase in the forecast level of
inﬂation and/or the output gap during the second year of a bank’s current projection should
justify a loosening of current policy, in the sense of a policy intended to raise projected
inﬂation and/or the output gap in the next few quarters.
The considerations that might lead one to choose the pure targeting rule as opposed to
the optimal instrument rule as a policy commitment remain as in our earlier discussion. We
note once again that the targeting rule (2.16) has the advantage of remaining well-deﬁned










¡1)ˆ qt] = 0;
which corresponds once again to a target criterion of the form (2.16), but with µi = µ∆ = 0:
This relation, however, is satisﬁed if and only if ˜ qt = 0;36 and so a simpler expression for the
36Here it is worth noting that the only reason that we were not similarly able to reduce (2.15) to an
equivalent target criterion that involves no dependence upon forecasts was the presence of the non-zero terms
involving ˆ {t¡1 and ˆ {t¡2: Thus there is an important connection between the irreducible forecast-dependence
of the optimal target criterion (2.16) and the need for a more complex kind of history-dependence of optimal
policy in the case that ¸i > 0:








In this simple case, we observe that the optimal targeting rule need not be forward-looking
at all, regardless of the degree of inﬂation inertia.





xt = ¯ ¼; (2.18)
where ¯ ¼ is an arbitrary constant.37 In this case, the target for the current quarter’s inﬂation
projection must be modiﬁed in response to variations in the current output-gap projection,
but neither lagged values nor projections farther in the future need be taken account of.
This might seem to contradict our earlier remarks about the necessary history-dependence
of optimal policy. However, one should note that in the case that ¸i = 0 and ° = 1; the only
target variables are ∆¼t and xt (not ¼t!), and the only constraint upon the feasible evolution
of these variables is provided by the aggregate-supply relation (2.1), which is purely forward-
looking in terms of these variables. The only state variables that matter for deﬁning the
feasible paths for the target variables from date t onward are the exogenous states needed
to identify ut and the conditional expectations Etut+j for all future horizons. Thus, in terms
of our previous deﬁnition, a “purely forward-looking” target criterion would be one that
refers only to projections for ∆¼t and xt in current and future quarters, and possibly to the
exogenous states just mentioned. The target criterion (2.18) is not purely forward-looking
in this sense; for it makes the target for current inﬂation acceleration ∆¼t dependent upon
past inﬂation, even though that variable is irrelevant to both the policymaker’s loss function
and to the constraints upon the future evolution of the relevant target variables.38
37If the central bank commits to enforcement of the target criterion (2.17) from some date t0 onward,
then the constant is determined by the initial conditions at the time that the rule is adopted: ¯ ¼ = ¼t0¡1 +
(¸x=·)xt0¡1:
38In supposing that it is possible for the absolute level of the inﬂation rate to be irrelevant for the possible
future evolution of the rate of change of inﬂation, we are obviously ignoring the consequences of the zero
lower bound on nominal interest rates. However, the choice of a loss function with ¸i = 0 is only appropriate
423 Further Extensions
Here we consider, more brieﬂy, some extensions of the method introduced above to more
complex (but more realistic) settings. As we shall see, not only can similar methods be
employed in a broader range of cases, but certain important conclusions obtained in the
above examples regarding the character of an optimal policy rule continue to apply in more
general settings.
3.1 Sticky Wages and Prices
As discussed in Woodford (2002, chap. 3), a more realistic model will allow for sticky wages
as well as prices. Here we consider how the form of an optimal policy rule changes in the case
that wages and prices are both sticky to a similar extent. We assume a structural model with
monopolistic competition among the suppliers of diﬀerentiated types of labor and Calvo-style
staggering of wage adjustment, as in Woodford (2002, chap. 3, sec. 4.1), and utility-based
stabilization objectives in accordance with the derivation in Woodford (2002, chap. 6). For
the sake of brevity, we proceed directly to the case of a model in which both wages and
prices are partially indexed to lagged inﬂation; the model of Erceg et al. (2000), in which
there is no such indexation, can be treated as a limiting case of this model.
As in Woodford (2002, chap. 3), the structural equations of our model are39
¼t ¡ °p¼t¡1 = ·p(xt + ut) + »p( ˆ wt ¡ ˆ w
n
t ) + ¯Et[¼t+1 ¡ °p¼t]; (3.1)
¼
w
t ¡ °w¼t¡1 = ·w(xt + ut) + »w(ˆ w
n
t ¡ ˆ wt) + ¯Et[¼
w
t+1 ¡ °w¼t]; (3.2)
together with the intertemporal IS relation (1.1). Here ¼w
t represents nominal wage inﬂation,
ˆ wt is the deviation of the log real wage from its steady-state level, ˆ wn
t represents the log
deviation of the “natural real wage” — i.e., the equilibrium real wage in the case of complete
wage and price ﬂexibility — from its stead-state level, and the coeﬃcients »p;»w;·p;·w are
if one judges that in practice this constraint does not bind, so that the optimal policy problem can be
considered as if there were no such constraint.
39Here we have rewritten logYt ¡ logY n
t as xt + ut; where as in our basic model, xt is the gap between
actual and eﬃcient output, and ut represents ineﬃcient variation in the natural rate of output.
43all positive. The coeﬃcients 0 · °p;°w · 1 indicate the degree of indexation of prices and
wages respectively to the lagged price index, analogous to the indexation of prices in the
model of section 2. (The model of Erceg et al. corresponds to the special case in which
°w = °p = 0.)
Under the microeconomic foundations for these relations discussed in Woodford (2002,
chap. 3), the appropriate welfare-theoretic stabilization objective is a discounted criterion
of the form (1.3), with a period loss function of the form40
Lt = ¸p(¼t ¡ °p¼t¡1)
2 + ¸w(¼wt ¡ °w¼t¡1)
2 + ¸x(xt ¡ x
¤)
2 + ¸i(it ¡ i
¤)
2: (3.3)
We wish to consider policies that minimize the criterion deﬁned by (1.3) and (3.3), subject
to the constraints imposed by the structural equations (1.1) and (3.1) – (3.2).
Using the same Lagrangian method as before to characterize optimal policy, we obtain a
set of ﬁrst-order conditions
¸p[(¼t¡°p¼t¡1)¡¯°pEt(¼t+1¡°p¼t)]¡¸w¯°wEt(¼w;t+1¡°w¼t)+¯
¡1¾Ξ1;t¡1
+¯°pEt(Ξ2;t+1 ¡ Ξ2t) ¡ (Ξ2t ¡ Ξ2;t¡1) + ¯°wEt(Ξ3;t+1 ¡ Ξ3t) ¡ Ξ4t = 0; (3.4)
¸w(¼wt ¡ °w¼t¡1) ¡ (Ξ3t ¡ Ξ3;t¡1) + Ξ4t = 0; (3.5)
¸x(xt ¡ x
¤) ¡ Ξ1t + ¯
¡1Ξ1;t¡1 + ·pΞ2t + ·wΞ3t = 0; (3.6)
¸i(it ¡ i
¤) ¡ ¾Ξ1t = 0; (3.7)
»pΞ2t ¡ »wΞ3t ¡ Ξ4t + ¯EtΞ4;t+1 = 0; (3.8)
where Ξ1t;Ξ2t;Ξ3t are the Lagrange multipliers associated with constraints (1.1), (3.1) and
(3.2) respectively, and Ξ4t is the multiplier associated with the constraint
ˆ wt = ˆ wt¡1 + ¼wt ¡ ¼t:
40The welfare-theoretic loss function for this model when °w = °p = 0 and there is no penalty for interest-
rate variability is derived in Woodford (2001b, chap. 6, sec. 4.4). When °w;°p > 0; the relation of wage and
price dispersion to wage and price inﬂation changes in the way discussed in Woodford (2002, chap. 6, sec.
2.2), resulting in the modiﬁcation indicated here of the ﬁrst two terms of the loss function. The justiﬁcation
for the ﬁnal term is the same as in the ﬂexible-wage model above.
44A case in which these equations are especially easy to interpret is the special case discussed
earlier, in which ·w = ·p = · (so that wages and prices are sticky to a similar degree) and
°w = °p = ° (so that wages and prices are indexed to lagged inﬂation to the same degree).
In this case, we can add (3.4) to (3.5), use (3.6) to substitute for Ξ2t + Ξ3t and (3.7) to





















This is again an Euler equation of the form (2.5), where again A(L) is deﬁned by (2.6) and
ft is deﬁned by (2.7) – (2.8); the only diﬀerence is that is in the last of these equations, ¼
qd
t
is now deﬁned as
¼
qd
t ´ ¸p¼t + ¸w¼wt ¡ °¼t¡1: (3.9)
rather than as in (2.4). It follows that optimal policy rules are of essentially the same form
as for the model with only sticky prices, except that terms that previously involved only
price inﬂation will now involve both wage and price inﬂation.
In the case that ° = 0 (the model of Erceg et al., 2000), we obtain an especially simple
result. The optimal instrument rule is again of the form (1.17), except that instead of
responding to current and lagged price inﬂation ¼t; the rule prescribes a response (with the
same coeﬃcients as before) to a weighted average of wage and price inﬂation,
¯ ¼t ´ ¸p¼t + ¸w¼wt:
For the calibrated parameter values suggested in Table 2 below, this index involves equal
weights on wage and price inﬂation. Similarly, the optimal pure targeting rule is again of
the form (1.25), except that the inﬂation projection Ft(¼) is replaced by a projection Ft(¯ ¼)
of the average of wage and price inﬂation just deﬁned, with the same weights on various
future horizons as before. Once again, wage inﬂation should receive a similar weight as
price inﬂation in the inﬂation forecast that is used in the central bank’s forecast-targeting
procedure.
45It is worth noting that we obtain diﬀerent coeﬃcients here for the optimal policy rule
than in section 2 only because the welfare-theoretic loss function is diﬀerent in the case that
wages as well as prices are sticky. If instead of (3.3) we were to assume a loss function of the
form (1.4) with arbitrary weights — a common assumption in non-welfare-theoretic analyses
of monetary policy rules — we would again have obtained precisely the same optimal policy
rules as in section 2. (This can be seen from the fact that (3.9) reduces to (2.4) if ¸w = 0:)
Thus sticky wages need not imply any diﬀerence in the nature of the tradeoﬀ between
inﬂation and output-gap stabilization available to the central bank; the main signiﬁcance of
wage stickiness is that it makes wage stabilization an appropriate objective for policy, with
consequences for the form of inﬂation index that belongs in an optimal policy rule.
In the case of indexation to lagged inﬂation, the roots of the lag polynomial A(L) are the
same as in the previous section, yielding the same forms as before for alternative optimal
policy rules. (The three optimal instrument rules are each deﬁned for the same values of °
as above; the unique optimal pure targeting rule is again deﬁned for all °:) Each of the three









where the coeﬃcients ½1;½2;Áx;µ¼; and µx and the coeﬃcients f®x
jg are all the same functions
of the model parameters as in (2.14), for each of the three rules. The coeﬃcients multiplying
the price and wage inﬂation forecasts satisfy









for each j ¸ 0; where Á¼ and the f®¼
jg are the coeﬃcients multiplying the inﬂation forecasts
in (2.14). Thus if wages and prices are forecasted to increase at the same rate, the eﬀect of
these inﬂation forecasts on the desired interest-rate setting is the same as before. However,
if the wage and price inﬂation forecasts diﬀer, optimal policy now depends on the wage
inﬂation forecast as well.
















When ° > 0; the optimal rule no longer involves only projections of a single weighted
average of wage and price inﬂation; this is because both wages and prices are (by assumption)
indexed only to lagged price inﬂation, and not to lagged wage inﬂation. The diﬀerence in the
optimal responses to wage inﬂation as opposed to price inﬂation is illustrated in Figures 5 and
6 for a calibrated example, with parameter values displayed in Table 2. Here we assume that
»w = »p;·w = ·p; and µwÁ
¡1 = µp: The values assumed for ¯;¾;µp; and ·p are taken from
the estimates of the IS equation and price inﬂation equation by Rotemberg and Woodford
(1997);41 the value of »p is instead taken from the inﬂation equation estimated by Sbordone
(2002a), which relates inﬂation to real marginal cost rather than to the output gap.42 The
values of ®w;®p;!w and !p implied by these estimates are also shown in the table,43 as are
the implied coeﬃcients ¸w;¸p and ¸x of the welfare-theoretic loss function. Note that wage
41Note that if ·w = ·p; as assumed here, then the real wage is unaﬀected by monetary policy, as discussed
in Woodford (2002, chap. 3, sec. 4.2). In this case the Rotemberg-Woodford inﬂation equation is correctly
speciﬁed even when wages are sticky (though their welfare analysis would not be correct), and their parameter
“·” corresponds to ·p here.
42Note that Sbordone’s inﬂation equation is equally valid regardless of whether wages are sticky or not.
43Even though our parameter values have been taken from two diﬀerent studies using diﬀerent data sets,
the implied values of these parameters are reasonable, and not too diﬀerent from the estimates of Amato
and Laubach (2001a); see, for example, Table 4.2 of Woodford (2002).





















Figure 5: Coeﬃcients of the optimal targeting rule (3.10) as functions of °. Coeﬃcients not
shown are the same as in Figure 1.
inﬂation and price inﬂation receive equal weight, and that the relative weight on output-
gap stabilization is the same as in Table 1. We also assume the same relative weight ¸i on
interest-rate stabilization as in the calibration above of the ﬂexible-wage model.44
Figure 5 shows the value of the coeﬃcients Áp and Áw in the optimal instrument rule
(3.10), for alternative values of ° ranging between zero and one. (Again the values are
shown for each of rules I, II and III in the cases where these exist; the minimally inertial
rule corresponds to rule I for low values of °; and rule III for high values.) Similarly, Figure
6 shows the relative weights on the inﬂation and output-gap forecasts at diﬀerent horizons
in the optimal rule.
We note that for moderate positive values of °; it continues to be the case that the
coeﬃcients on the price-inﬂation forecasts are quite similar to those on the wage-inﬂation
forecasts; essentially, the coeﬃcient Á¼ shown in Figure 1 is split roughly equally between the
coeﬃcients Áp and Áw; while the relative weights on forecasts at diﬀerent horizons remain
similar to those shown in Figure 2. Thus it is not too bad an approximation to optimal
policy to choose the same rule as the one described in section 2, but to respond to forecasts
44If ¸i resulted solely from the existence of transactions frictions, as discussed in Woodford (2002, chap.
6, sec. 4.1), the same calibrated value would be appropriate regardless of the assumed degree of wage
stickiness. In the case that ¸i is chosen to reﬂect the advantages of lower interest-rate variability as a result
of the zero bound, as in Woodford (1999a), then the appropriate value would depend on the assumed variance
of disturbances. In this case, the appropriate value is not independent of whether we assume wages to be
sticky, because the other stabilization objectives are not the same in this case; but we do not here consider
the degree to which the appropriate value of ¸i should change.


















Rule I, g = 0.1 
Rule I, g = 0.3 
Rule III, g = 0.5 
Rule III, g = 1  
Figure 6: Relative weights on forecasts at diﬀerent horizons in the optimal rule (3.10).
of an index that is a (roughly equally-weighted) average of wage and price inﬂation. For
larger values of °; however, the optimal responses to forecasts of wage and price inﬂation are
substantially diﬀerent. The optimal value of Áp remains positive, and similar in magnitude
to the previous coeﬃcient Á¼; while the optimal value of Áw falls to zero as ° approaches one.
This does not mean that it ceases to be optimal to respond to forecasts of wage inﬂation,
only that the sum of the weights at diﬀerent horizons is zero;45 that is, when ° = 1 the
rule prescribes a response only to the forecasted rate of acceleration of wage inﬂation, rather
than the rate of wage inﬂation itself (given the expected rate of price inﬂation). Speciﬁcally,
the optimal rule prescribes a negative response to expected deceleration of wage inﬂation
over the next three quarters relative to the current rate of wage inﬂation; it also prescribes
45This explains why we plot relative weights rather than the weights ®w;j in Figure 6. If we normalize
the ®w;j to sum to one, then the weights are undeﬁned in the limiting case ° = 1: Nonetheless, the relative
weights have well-deﬁned limiting values, shown in the ﬁgure. The coeﬃcients multiplying any given forecast
of wage inﬂation — i.e., the products Áw®w;j — also remain well-deﬁned, so there is a well-deﬁned optimal
policy rule in this case.
49a (weaker) positive response to expected acceleration of wage inﬂation farther in the future.
Despite these complications, we note that it continues to be the case that optimal policy
depends very little on inﬂation forecasts (either for wages or prices) farther in the future than
the coming year, even in the case that there is substantial inﬂation inertia in both wages
and prices. And even with regard to forecasts for the coming year, current interest rates
should respond most strongly (and in particular, most positively) to projected wage and price
inﬂation in the current quarter, rather than to forecasted inﬂation later in the year. Thus
there is once again little support for the kinds of forward-looking rules sometimes oﬀered as
descriptions of the behavior of current inﬂation-targeting central banks.
3.2 Delays in the Eﬀects of Monetary Policy
Empirical models such as those of Rotemberg and Woodford (1997), Amato and Laubach
(2001a), Christiano et al. (2001), Altig et al. (2002), or Boivin and Giannoni (2002) diﬀer
from the simple models discussed above in that both output and inﬂation are predetermined,
so that neither is immediately aﬀected by an unexpected change in policy. Here we consider
the consequences for optimal policy of allowing for such delays in the eﬀect of policy, modeled
in the way described in Woodford (2002, chap. 4, sec. 4).
Let us consider a model with ﬂexible wages, but sticky prices indexed to lagged inﬂation,
as in section 2, but now assuming that both price changes and aggregate private demand are
predetermined d periods in advance, for some d ¸ 0: For simplicity, let us suppose that the
eﬃcient level of output is also known d periods in advance, so that the output gap is also a
predetermined variable.46 In this case, the structural equations of our model are
xt = Et¡dxt+1 ¡ ¾Et¡d(it ¡ ¼t+1 ¡ r
n
t ); (3.11)
¼t ¡ °¼t¡1 = ·Et¡dxt + ¯Et¡d(¼t+1 ¡ °¼t) + Et¡dut: (3.12)
46Alternatively, in equations (3.11) – (3.12) we may interpret xt to mean ˆ Yt ¡ Et¡d ˆ Y e
t : In this case, the
loss function (1.3) – (2.2) is still correct, up to terms (involving the component of ˆ Y e
t that is not forecastable
d periods in advance) that are independent of policy.
50The welfare-theoretic loss function continues to be given by (1.3) and (2.2). The Lagrangian























Ξ1;t¡d[xt ¡ Et¡dxt+1 + ¾Et¡d(it ¡ ¼t+1 ¡ r
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t again denotes the quasi-diﬀerenced inﬂation rate (2.4). Here we write Ξ1;t¡d; Ξ2;t¡d
for the multipliers associated with constraints (3.11) and (3.12) respectively, to indicate that
each multiplier is determined at date t ¡ d, given that there is one such constraint for each
possible state of the world at date t ¡ d.







































dropping terms that are independent of policy. The ﬁrst-order conditions that characterize






¡1¾Ξ1;t¡d¡1 ¡ ¯°Et¡dΞ2;t¡d+1 + (1 + ¯°)Ξ2;t¡d ¡ Ξ2;t¡d¡1 = 0; (3.14)
together with conditions (1.14) – (1.15), but with Ξi;t¡d substituted for Ξit (for i = 1;2) in
the latter equations. Each of the ﬁrst-order conditions just listed holds for each t ¸ d: In
addition, ¼d¡1 is given as an initial condition, the initial lagged Lagrange multipliers satisfy
(1.16), and one has additional ﬁrst-order conditions
it = i
¤
for the interest rate in periods t = 0;:::;d ¡ 1: Note, however, that these last conditions,
that relate only to the ﬁrst few periods following the adoption of the optimal commitment,
are irrelevant to the characterization of optimal policy from a timeless perspective.
51As above, we can use conditions (1.14) – (1.15) to substitute for Ξ1;t¡d and Ξ2;t¡d in
(3.14), obtaining an Euler equation of the form
A1(L)(it ¡ i
¤) + ¯°Et¡d(it+1 ¡ i
¤) = ¡Et¡dft; (3.15)
where A1(L) is the quadratic lag polynomial such that
A(L) = ¯° + LA1(L)
is the polynomial deﬁned in (2.6), and ft is again deﬁned in (2.7) – (2.8). It follows from
this that under a policy that is optimal from a timeless perspective, it depends solely on
public information at date t¡d: Hence in the case of structural equations of this kind, there
would be no change in the character of optimal policy were one to impose the constraint
that the interest-rate operating target must be chosen in advance, as proposed for example
by McCallum and Nelson (1999).
Taking the expectation of (3.15) conditional upon information at date t¡d, one obtains
Et¡d[A(L)(it+1 ¡ i
¤)] = ¡Et¡dft;
which is identical to (2.5) except for the conditioning information set. The same manipu-
lations as before can then be used to derive the same form of representations for optimal
policy, with the change in the conditioning information set for expectations. There are once
again the three possible forms for an optimal instrument rule discussed in section 2 above,
and each exists for the same values of ° as before. Each of the three rules is of the form
it = (1 ¡ ½1)i
¤ + ½1it¡1 + ½2∆it¡1 + Á¼Et¡dFt(¼) +
Áx
4




where the coeﬃcients are exactly the same functions of the model parameters as in (2.14).
Similarly, optimal policy can again be represented by a pure targeting rule with a target




Et¡dFt(x) = µ¼¼t¡1 +
µx
4
xt¡1 ¡ µi(it¡1 ¡ i
¤) ¡ µ∆∆it¡1; (3.17)
52where the coeﬃcients are exactly the same functions of the model parameters as in (2.16).
Thus the optimal policy rules are of exactly the same form as before, except that now the
period t interest rate should be chosen in period t ¡ d; and on the basis of the inﬂation and
output-gap projections that are available at that earlier date. The projections, however,
should be for the same time periods as before.
In the case that ° = 0 (our baseline model, with a standard “New Keynesian Phillips
curve”, except for the d¡period delays), the projections in (3.16) again are only for inﬂation
and the output gap in period t. Since both of these variables are known at date t ¡ d,
according to our model, the optimal instrument rule is once again of the form (1.17), with
coeﬃcients (1.18) – (1.19). Thus in this case there is no change at all in the optimal policy
rule. It remains true that the delays imply that it is optimal for nominal interest rates to
be perfectly forecastable d periods in advance. However, this principle does not imply that
a rule that prescribes a response to contemporaneous inﬂation and output-gap variations,
as under the Taylor rule, is therefore suboptimal. For under our assumptions, inﬂation and
the output gap are themselves completely forecastable d periods in advance. This example
shows that an optimal policy rule need not be at all forward-looking, even in the case that
the eﬀects of monetary policy are entirely delayed.
Of course, even if there are no eﬀects of a change in monetary policy until d periods later,
it need not follow that inﬂation and the output gap are completely predetermined. Only the
components of these variables that are aﬀected by monetary policy need be predetermined. In
a more complex model, we may assume that the forecastable components of inﬂation and the
output gap, Et¡d¼t and Et¡dxt, satisfy equations (3.11) – (3.12), while the observed variables
are equal to these forecastable components plus exogenous disturbance terms.47 In this case,
both equations (3.11) – (3.12) should include additional unforecastable disturbance terms,
as in the model discussed in Svensson and Woodford (1999). In this case, the Lagrangian
47An IS relation of this form is presented in Woodford (2002, chap. 4, sec. 4.1), where the additional
disturbance results from the unforecastable components of government purchases and/or the eﬃcient level
of output. In the case of inﬂation, one might suppose that wholesale prices are determined d periods in
advance, and satisfy (3.12), while the retail price of each good is equal to the wholesale price plus an
exogenous markup, which markup need not be forecastable in advance.
53(3.13) is still correct, up to terms that are independent of policy, and the same ﬁrst-order
conditions continue to apply. The optimal policy rules just derived continue to be correct,
except that the central bank should respond only to variation in the forecastable components
of inﬂation and the output gap. For example, the optimal instrument rule takes the form
it = (1¡½1)i







instead of (3.16), and even when ° = 0 the central bank should respond to forecasts of
inﬂation and output d periods in advance, rather than to current inﬂation and output.
We ﬁnd that our previous conclusions about the character of optimal policy remain largely
intact, even when we allow for delays in the eﬀect of monetary policy. An optimal instrument
rule still involves interest-rate inertia to exactly the same degree as was determined earlier;
in particular, the optimal rule is super-inertial for all possible values of the parameters. We
also ﬁnd once again that optimal policy is only modestly forward-looking. If the components
of inﬂation and the output gap that are aﬀected by monetary policy are determined d periods
in advance, it follows that policy should respond only to forecasts of inﬂation and the output
gap d or more periods in the future. However, the interest rate in any given period should
be set (d periods earlier) on the basis of the projected inﬂation rate and output gap for
the period in which the interest rate applies and periods immediately thereafter; and even
when the degree of inﬂation inertia is substantial, interest rates should be based mainly on
projections for that period and a few months farther in the future. There continues to be
little support for the idea that primary emphasis should be placed on inﬂation forecasts for
a period one to two years later than the period for which the interest rate is set.
3.3 Imperfect Information about the State of the Economy
Our analysis thus far has assumed that the central bank has complete information about the
current state of the economy, and thus can bring about an optimal state-contingent path for
its instrument, regardless of how that may require its operating target to vary in response
to disturbances. In reality, central-bank information about current conditions is imperfect.
54At the time that the operating target is chosen, the current quarter’s inﬂation rate and level
of real GDP — both required to implement a rule such as (1.17) — are not yet known,
and must be forecasted based on a variety of indicators. The estimates available “in real
time” diﬀer substantially from the values that are eventually determined to have been correct
(Orphanides, 1998). Still less does a central bank know the current quarter’s eﬃcient level
of output in real time; estimates of “potential output” can be revised by several percentage
points after some years of additional data become available. A proper analysis of optimal
policy needs to take account of such constraints upon the central bank’s information.
The Lagrangian method used above to characterize the optimal state-contingent plan can
be adapted to a situation in which the central bank has imperfect information, as shown by
Svensson and Woodford (2001). One obtains similar ﬁrst-order conditions, but with changes
in the information sets with respect to which certain expectations are conditioned. As a
simple example, consider again our basic neo-Wicksellian model, as described in section 1,
but suppose now that the central bank has less information than the private sector each
period. The ﬁrst-order conditions (1.13) – (1.14) for the optimal state-contingent plan still
apply, but (1.15) must now be replaced by
¸i(it ¡ i
¤) + ¾Ξ1tjt = 0; (3.18)
where we use the notation ztjt for the expectation of any variable zt conditional upon the
central bank’s information set at the time that the period t instrument setting is chosen. This
last condition is modiﬁed in the way indicated because the central bank must choose a single
instrument setting for each of the possible states at date t that it is unable to distinguish
on the basis of its information, though Ξ1t (the shadow value to the bank of relaxing the
constraint associated with the IS equation) may diﬀer across those states.
In this case, we can no longer use (3.18) to eliminate Ξ1t from the other two ﬁrst-order
conditions, and so we can no longer obtain an instrument rule that refers only to the evolution
of the interest rate, the inﬂation rate and the output gap. However, we can still deﬁne a
55variable





indicating an ideal instrument setting that would be optimal if the central bank had the
information required to implement it. Then condition (3.19) can be used with (1.13) –
(1.14) as before to show that this variable evolves according to a law of motion
¯ {t = (1 ¡ ½1)i
¤ + ½1¯ {t¡1 + ½2∆¯ {t¡1 + Á¼¼t + Áx∆xt=4; (3.20)
where the coeﬃcients are again deﬁned in (1.18) – (1.19). (We can assign arbitrary initial
conditions to begin this recursion, and still obtain a policy rule that is optimal from a timeless
perspective.) First-order condition (3.18) then can be written simply as
it = ¯ {tjt: (3.21)
This states that the central bank chooses an operating target for each period that equals the
expected value of the ideal instrument setting conditional upon the bank’s information set
at the time that it must choose.
Under imperfect information, then, optimal policy can be described by the rule (3.21),
where the ideal instrument setting referred to in this rule is deﬁned by (3.20). In practice,
estimation of the conditional expectation referred to in this rule will require the use of a
Kalman ﬁlter, the coeﬃcients of which depend on the law of motion of the ideal instrument
setting (3.20). The coeﬃcients of the Kalman ﬁlter also depend on the equilibrium co-
movement of the endogenous indicator variables with inﬂation and the output gap, which
in turn depend on the coeﬃcients of the Kalman ﬁlter (insofar as the central bank’s policy
is based on it). This ﬁxed-point problem is discussed further in Svensson and Woodford
(2001).
Svensson and Woodford show that certain equations that describe the optimal instrument
setting continue to hold in the case of imperfect information, except that variables not
observed by the central bank are replaced by their expectations conditional upon the bank’s
information set. Thus this kind of linear-quadratic policy problem possesses a certainty
56equivalence property. Nonetheless, it is important to realize that one cannot naively apply
this principle to any rule that describes optimal policy in the case of full information. For
example, it would not be correct to set interest rates using (1.17), simply replacing each
term on the right-hand side by the central bank’s estimate of the term at the time that it
sets it. This application of certainty equivalence would suggest a rule of the form
it = (1 ¡ ½1)i




since it¡1 and it¡2 must be part of the central bank’s information set. But this is not an
optimal rule in the case of imperfect information; instead of it¡1 and it¡2; the optimal rule
responds to ¯ {t¡1jt and ¯ {t¡2jt: These are not the same, since in general the central bank will
have additional information by the time that it sets it about what the correct values of ¯ {t¡1
and ¯ {t¡2 were, relative to its estimates at the time of its earlier interest-rate decisions. Hence
the notion of “certainty equivalence” must be applied with care.
Nonetheless, optimal policy under imperfect information is in many ways similar to op-
timal policy under full information. For example, it is no more forward-looking than our
previous results indicated; in the present example, the optimal interest-rate operating target
for period t depends on the projections ¼tjt and xtjt, but not on projections of inﬂation or
the output gap for any dates farther in the future. And once again, optimal policy will
imply substantial persistence in interest-rate ﬂuctuations. Taking the expectation of (3.20)
conditional upon the central bank’s information set at date t ¡ 2; one obtains
itjt¡2 = (1 ¡ ½1)i




This in turn implies that
½k+2(i) = (½1 + ½2)½k+1(i) ¡ ½2½k(i) + Á¼¯k+2(¼;i) +
Áx
4
(¯k+2(x;i) ¡ ¯k+1(x;i)); (3.22)
for each k ¸ 0; where we use the notation
½k(z) ´ corr(zt+k;zt); ¯k(y;z) ´ cov(yt+k;zt)=var(zt):
57Equation (3.22) is not enough by itself to allow one to solve for the autocorrelation function
of the equilibrium interest rate process f½k(i)g; this depends on the regression coeﬃcients
f¯k(¼;i)g and f¯k(x;i)g, which cannot be determined from the form of the monetary policy
rule alone. But (3.22) is the same restriction on the autocorrelation function as is implied
by (1.17) in the full-information case; thus the fact that ½1;½2 > 1 in (3.20) makes a high
degree of serial correlation of interest rates likely in the case of imperfect information as well.
4 Conclusions
We have shown that robustly optimal policy rules can be constructed for each of a variety
of simple forward-looking models of the monetary transmission mechanism. We have seen
that these rules may take the form either of an implicit instrument rule — an interest-rate
feedback rule that generalizes the one proposed by Taylor (1993) — or of a pure targeting
rule — a history-dependent inﬂation target that generalizes the “ﬂexible inﬂation targeting”
rule proposed by Svensson (1999). In the cases where both representations of optimal policy
are possible, these are actually equivalent policy rules, at least as far as their implications for
rational-expectations equilibrium are concerned, though the policy commitment is described
in apparently diﬀerent ways.
Our examples oﬀer insights into several questions posed in the introduction. First, we
have seen that, at least in the case of the simple models considered here,48 optimal policy
rules can be expressed in terms of a commitment to bring about a certain (time-invariant)
linear relationship between the paths of the short-term nominal interest-rate instrument of
the central bank, an inﬂation measure, and a measure of the output gap, as proposed by
both Taylor and Svensson. And this is not only a possible representation of optimal policy
in these cases, but one with uniquely desirable properties, discussed in detail in Giannoni
48While the models are simple, it is perhaps worth recalling that they do represent log-linearizations of
completely speciﬁed intertemporal general-equilibrium models of the monetary transmission mechanism, and
at least those considered in section 3 are already sophisticated enough to match a number of salient features
of the econometric evidence on the eﬀects of monetary policy shocks, as discussed in Woodford (2002, chaps.
3-4).
58and Woodford (2002). Of course, in more complex (but more realistic) models, optimal
rules are likely to involve additional state variables besides these three; we have already
seen an illustration of this in section 3.1, where, in general, the presence of wage as well as
price stickiness implies that an optimal rule will involve responses to more than one inﬂation
measure (wage as well as price inﬂation). Nonetheless, the general form of rules that have
been widely discussed in the recent literature are not found to be fundamentally misguided;
there is no reason why an optimal rule must pay attention to monetary aggregates, for
example, or why it must explicitly respond in diﬀerent ways to diﬀerent types of disturbances.
An issue that is much debated by monetary economists is whether it is desirable for
monetary policy to respond to a measure of the output gap, as is prescribed both by the
“Taylor rule” and by common examples of “ﬂexible inﬂation targeting” rules. Here we have
found that our optimal policy rules all prescribe interest-rate adjustments or modiﬁcation of
the inﬂation target in response to changes in the projected path of the (correctly deﬁned)
output gap, and thus our results provide some justiﬁcation for the common emphasis upon
this variable. While it might also be possible to formulate policy rules consistent with an
optimal equilibrium that would not involve explicit reference to this variable, such alternative
representations of optimal policy would either not be robustly optimal like the rules derived
here — the coeﬃcients of the optimal rule would depend upon precise details of the assumed
statistical character of the disturbances49 — or they would not be direct rules — they
would involve explicit reference to variables other than the target variables, such as speciﬁc
exogenous disturbances.50 Hence, insofar as a robustly optimal, direct rule is desirable, there
49For example, Woodford (1999a) derives an optimal policy rule for the model of section 1 that involves
only the short-term nominal interest rate and an inﬂation measure, and argues that this representation of
optimal policy is desirable because it can be implemented without requiring the central bank to measure
the output gap. However, the rule discussed there is optimal only under a very speciﬁc assumption about
the disturbances: there are no cost-push shocks, and the natural rate of interest is an AR(1) process, with
innovations that are revealed in the same period that they aﬀect the natural rate. Furthermore, the numerical
coeﬃcients of the optimal rule depend on the coeﬃcient of serial correlation of the natural-rate disturbances.
Instead, the rules discussed in section 1 are equally optimal under this speciﬁcation of the disturbances and
a vast number of other possibilities.
50For example, an optimal policy rule could be constructed for the model of section 1, under a particular
speciﬁcation of the statistical properties of the disturbances, by solving for the optimal state-contingent
paths f¯ {t; ¯ ¼tg of the nominal interest rate and inﬂation, and then choosing a policy rule of the form it =
59is an important advantage to expressing the central bank’s policy commitment in terms of
a rule that involves the bank’s estimate of (or projection of) the path of the output gap.
There are certainly substantial diﬃculties involved in accurate measurement of the output
gap in practice. But many of these can be well-represented by additive measurement error of
the kind considered by Svensson and Woodford (2001), so that certainty-equivalence applies,
as discussed in section 3.3. In this case, it is still optimal to commit to a policy rule with the
same coeﬃcient on the central bank’s estimate of the output gap as would be optimal under
full information; the measurement error aﬀects only the way in which it is optimal for the
central bank to form its estimate of current and past output gaps. For example, an optimal
estimate of the output gap will generally make use of information about wages and prices,
and not simply available quantity measures. But this does not mean that it is not useful for
the central bank to describe its policy commitment in terms of a relationship between the
output gap and other variables. For this description of policy will be much more robust than
an explicit description of the way that the central bank should respond to speciﬁc indicator
variables, which will depend on the bank’s current beliefs about the statistical properties of
the various disturbances (including the ones responsible for the measurement problems).
It is also worth noting that the errors that have been observed historically in real-time
estimates of the output gap (documented by Orphanides, 2000) have been much greater in
the case of estimates of the absolute level of the output gap than in the case of estimates of
the quarter-to-quarter changes in the gap.51 (Errors in the recognition of shifts in the trend
rate of growth of potential output until years later have caused substantial, highly persistent
¯ {t + Á(¼t ¡ ¯ ¼t); where Á > 1 in conformity with the “Taylor Principle”. It follows from Proposition xx of
Woodford (2002, chap. 4) that a rule of this kind implies a determinate rational-expectations equilibrium,
and it is obvious that the rule is consistent with the optimal paths of the variables. However, such a rule
involves explicit reference to the state of the world as deﬁned by the history of exogenous disturbances, and
the way in which the terms ¯ {t and ¯ ¼t vary with the history of disturbances also depends on the details of
the assumed statistical properties of the disturbances.
51This assumes, as does Orphanides, that current conventional estimates of past levels of potential output
are in fact correct. Of course, the conception of potential output upon which such estimates are based may
not be the same one as in the “output gap” to which an optimal policy rule would respond, as suggested by
Woodford (2001). But this sort of error is not an inevitable one, resulting from data limitations, but rather
one that can be eliminated through clariﬁcation of the optimal rule.
60mis-estimates of the absolute gap; but this particular source of measurement error has little
eﬀect on the higher-frequency components of the output gap estimate.) But the optimal
rules exhibited above all involve only the projected path of quarter-to-quarter changes in
the output gap, and are independent of the absolute level of the gap, even though it is the
absolute size of the gap that one wishes to stabilize. Because of this, it is less obvious that
output-gap mismeasurement should be a serious problem in the case of the optimal rules
derived here than under common proposals that would make policy depend on the absolute
level of the current or projected future output gap.
Our analysis also oﬀers insights into the question of which inﬂation measure policy should
respond to or target. The answer given here is the particular measure or measures that
appear as target variables in the welfare-theoretic loss function derived according to the
principles set out in Woodford (2002, chap. 6), which is to say, the inﬂation measures that
are directly related to measures of the relative-price distortions that result from imperfect
synchronization of wage and price changes. The inﬂation measure that is correct will thus
depend on the nature of the nominal rigidities associated with wage and price-setting, which
is ultimately an empirical question. In our baseline model, with ﬂexible wages and the
same degree of stickiness of all goods prices, the relevant inﬂation rate is the change in
a uniformly weighted index of goods prices, which conforms fairly closely to the kind of
price index actually targeted by the central banks with inﬂation targets. But under other
assumptions, the correct inﬂation measure will diﬀer. For example, we have shown in section
3.1 that if wages as well as prices are sticky, the optimal rule must involve wage inﬂation as
well as price inﬂation. Similarly, if some goods prices are sticky while others are not, the
correct inﬂation measure will be an index of “core inﬂation,” — an index of the changes in
the prices only of the sticky-price goods, as discussed in Woodford (2002, chap. 6, sec. 4.3).
We also obtain some tentative conclusions about the degree of history-dependence of
optimal policy rules. Even in our baseline model, which posits an extremely simple dynamic
structure, our optimal policy rules involve substantial history-dependence of a kind not
present in proposals such as those of Taylor (1993) and Svensson (1997, 1999). In addition
61to the fact that policy should respond to the projected change in the output gap rather than
its level, which makes the recent past level of the output gap relevant for current policy, we
ﬁnd that past nominal interest rates should aﬀect the current policy setting. Speciﬁcally,
both our optimal instrument rule (1.17) and our optimal pure targeting rule (1.25) have
the feature that, for any given inﬂation and output-gap projections, interest rates should
be higher than they otherwise would be if (i) interest rates have recently been higher than
average, or (ii) interest rates have recently been rising.52 Thus the optimal rules incorporate
both the interest-rate persistence (a positive eﬀect of it¡1 on the choice of it) and interest-
rate momentum (a positive eﬀect of ∆it¡1 on the choice of ∆it) that characterize the actual
Fed reaction functions estimated by Judd and Rudebusch (1998).
Finally, we have also explored the degree to which optimal rules should make policy a
function of projections of inﬂation and/or output many quarters in the future. In our baseline
model, it is possible to formulate a robustly optimal policy rule (the implicit instrument
rule (1.17) that involves no projections farther in the future than the period for which the
nominal interest-rate operating target is being set. Perhaps surprisingly, this rule is optimal
regardless of what we may assume about the availability of advance information about future
disturbances. Of course, this strong result depends on the purely forward-looking character
of that simple model of inﬂation and output determination. But even when we allow for a
high degree of inﬂation inertia, in section 2, we ﬁnd that an optimal policy rule depends much
more on the projected inﬂation rate and output gap in the quarter for which policy is being
set that on the projections for any later horizons. And while projections for later quarters do
matter to some extent if the degree of inﬂation inertia is suﬃciently great, projections farther
than a year in the future matter little even in this case. Thus we ﬁnd little justiﬁcation for
a policy that gives primary attention to the inﬂation forecast at a horizon two years in
the future, as is true of the inﬂation-forecast targeting currently practiced at the Bank of
England.
52In the case of (1.25), one observes that either a high value of it¡1 or a high value of ∆it¡1 require a
lower value for the output-gap-adjusted inﬂation forecast — that is, these conditions require policy to be
tightened, though the rule itself does not specify the interest-rate setting that this involves.
62It is important nonetheless to stress that our results do not justify a purely backward-
looking approach to the conduct of policy. In all of the cases considered, our optimal rules
are implicit rules, which is to say that they specify a criterion that must be satisﬁed by the
central bank’s projections of inﬂation and output given its policy. The criterion in question
involves variables the values of which depend on the current policy action that is chosen;
hence they must be projected using a model of the monetary transmission mechanism, rather
than simply being measured. It is true that optimal policy could also be described by an
explicit (purely backward-looking) instrument rule, specifying the instrument setting as a
function of current exogenous disturbances and past (or at any rate predetermined) state
variables, that need simply be measured. But such a representation of optimal policy would
not be robust to changes in the assumed character of the disturbance processes, unlike the
implicit rules derived here. Hence we would argue that the use of a quantitative model,
that can be used to project the eﬀects of prospective policy settings, is essential to the
optimal conduct of monetary policy. And in a model that takes account of forward-looking
private sector behavior, projections for the current quarter cannot generally be made without
forecasting the economy’s subsequent evolution as well.
Furthermore, in the case that spending and pricing decisions are predetermined d periods
in advance, as assumed in many empirical models, the optimal policy is one under which the
central bank’s interest-rate operating target is also chosen d periods in advance, on the basis
of projections of inﬂation and output for the period for which the interest rate is being chosen
(if not projections farther in the future as well). In this case, policy decisions necessarily
will depend crucially on projections of conditions at least d periods in the future. However,
the lag d by which spending or pricing decisions are predetermined is not plausibly longer
than one or two quarters. And even in this case, no justiﬁcation is provided for basing the
interest-rate operating target for a given period on forecasts regarding points in time that
are much more distant than the period for which the interest-rate decision is being made.
Hence our results provide little support for the desirability of basing interest-rate decisions
primarily on forecasts of conditions as long as two years in the future.
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67A Proofs of Propositions
A.1 The Optimal Non-Inertial Plan
In the case that the disturbances are of the form (1.6) – (1.7), the optimal non-inertial plan
is given by
zt = ¯ z + Fet; it = ¯ { + fiet
where zt ´ [¼t;xt]
0, et ´ [ˆ rn
t ;ut]
0 : The long-run average values ¯ z;¯ {; and the response coeﬃ-
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68A.2 Proposition 4
Proposition 4. Let ·;¾;¸i;¸x > 0;0 < ¯ < 1; 0 · ½r < 1; and 0 · ½u < 1: Suppose
the disturbances are of the form (1.6) – (1.7), with autocorrelation coeﬃcients satisfying the
bounds
0 < (1 ¡ ½r)(1 ¡ ¯½r) ¡ ½r·¾ (A.1)




Then (1.8) deﬁnes a Taylor rule of the form (1.5) with coeﬃcients Á¼ > 1;Áx > 0: Fur-
thermore, commitment to this rule implies a determinate rational expectations equilibrium,
which implements the optimal non-inertial plan.












Under the assumption of the proposition, we have ¼r > 0; ¼u > 0; xr > 0; xu < 0; ir > 0;
and iu > 0: It follows that
¼uxr ¡ ¼rxu > 0: (A.4)
Furthermore,
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for j 2 fr;ug: Note that (A.1) and (A.2) imply ½r ¸ ½u; °u ¸ °r; so that Â1 > 0: Moreover,
given that (1 ¡ ½u)(1 ¡ ¯½r) ¡ ½u·¾ > 0, we have
Â2 = »r (°u (1 ¡ ½u)(1 ¡ ¯½r) ¡ ½u·¾ (1 ¡ ½u)(1 ¡ ¯½r)) ¡ »u (°r ¡ ½r·¾)½u¾·
¸ »r (°u°r ¡ ½u·¾°u) ¡ »u (°r ¡ ½r·¾)½u¾·
¸ »r°u (°r ¡ ½r·¾) ¡ »u (°r ¡ ½r·¾)½u¾·
= »u ((1 ¡ ¯½r)(1 ¡ ½u) ¡ ½u¾·)(°r ¡ ½r·¾)
¸ »u (°r ¡ ½r¾·)(°r ¡ ½r·¾)
= »u (°r ¡ ½r¾·)
2 > 0:
It follows that Áx > 0:
We now show that Á¼ > 1: Using (A.3), we have
Á¼ ¡ 1 =
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The numerator N¼ can be viewed as the quadratic polynomial
N¼ (¸i) ´ n2¸
2
i + n1¸i + n0;
70where
n2 = ¡¾
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Since N¼ (¸i) is concave in ¸i; and satisﬁes N¼ (0) > 0; N¼ (+1) = ¡1; we know that















·»r (1 ¡ ½u)
°u ¡ ½u·¾
((1 ¡ ¯½r)(1 ¡ ¯½u) + ·¾)(½r ¡ ½u)
¸ 0:
Thus N¼ (¸i) > 0 for any ¸i satisfying 0 < ¸i < ·¾
°u¡½u·¾; or equivalently for any ¸i > 0
satisfying (A.2). It follows that Á¼ > 1 under the conditions of the proposition.
We ﬁnally show that commitment to the rule (1.8) implies a determinate rational ex-
pectations equilibrium, which implements the optimal non-inertial plan. First note that the
system of equations given by the structural equation (1.1), (1.2), and the policy rule (1.5)
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where zt ´ [¼t;xt]


















As discussed in Giannoni and Woodford (2002, sec. 2), the equilibrium is determinate if the
71characteristic polynomial
p(¹) ´ det













has exactly nZ = 0 roots j¹j < 1; or equivalently, if it has both roots outside the unit circle.
Next, since the policy rule (1.8) is of the form of (1.5) with Á¼ > 1; Áx > 0; a commitment
to the rule (1.8) implies that the characteristic polynomial p(¹) has the following properties
p(0) = 1 + ¾
Áx
4








(1 + ¯) + (1 + Á¼)·¾ > 0
p(1) = ¾·(Á¼ ¡ 1) + ¾
Áx
4
(1 ¡ ¯) > 0
Using Proposition 1 of Woodford (2002, chap. 4), we know that p(¹) has both roots outside
the unit circle if
p(0) > 1; p(¡1) > 0; and p(1) > 0:
Since these inequalities are satisﬁed under a commitment to the policy rule (1.8), p(¹) has
both roots outside the unit circle. It follows that a commitment to the rule (1.8) implies
a determinate rational expectations equilibrium, which implements the optimal non-inertial
plan.
A.3 Proposition 5
Proposition 5. Suppose that ·;¾;¸i;¸x > 0;0 < ¯ < 1; and 0 < ½ < 1: Then for
all forecast horizons k longer than some critical value, the rule of the form (1.9) that is
consistent with the optimal non-inertial plan implies indeterminacy of rational-expectations
equilibrium.
Proof: The structural equations (1.1) and (1.2) can be written in matrix form as
following
ˆ IEtzt+1 = Azt + Bit + Cst (A.6)
72where zt ´ [¼t;xt]
























The policy rule (1.9) can also be written as
it = Á
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¤0 are non-predetermined, the dynamic
system (A.8) admits a unique bounded solution if and only if all of the 2k roots ¹ of the
characteristic equation
det
£¯ I ¡ ¹ ¯ A
¤
= 0
are inside the unit circle.
Characteristic polynomial. First note that the characteristic polynomial in our model
is given by
det
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73Since the determinant of any matrix remains unchanged if a multiple of one column is added
to another column, we multiply each of the ﬁnal block of two columns by ¹ and add it to
the next-to-last block, to obtain
det
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We then multiply each of the block of this next-to-last block by ¹, and add it to the previous
block, and so on, to get ﬁnally
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Given that jD22j 6= 0; we have
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k¡1 + (·Á¼ + Áx=4)¾¹ ¡ Áx¯¾=4: (A.9)
The characteristic polynomial det
£¯ I ¡ ¹ ¯ A
¤
has k¡1 roots ¹k+2 = ¹k+3 = ::: = ¹2k = 0: The
system (A.8) has a unique bounded solution if and only if the k + 1 roots of p(¹); denoted
¹1;¹2;:::;¹k+1; also lie inside the unit circle. Note that for any polynomial of the form (A.9),
























74Thus a necessary condition for the system (A.8) to have a unique bounded solution is
jÁx¯¾=4j < 1: (A.10)
Alternatively, if (A.10) is violated for some k; then p(¹) must have at least one root outside
the unit circle, so that the dynamic system (A.8) implies indeterminacy of the REE.
Optimal non-inertial plan. As indicated in the text, the unique rule that is consistent
with the optimal non-inertial plan (in the case that ½r = ½u = ½ 2 [0;1]), is given by (1.10),
where fiF ¡1 is independent of k: It follows that
Á
0
z = [Á¼;Áx=4] = ½
¡kfiF
¡1:
We now consider three possible cases.
Case 1: optimal coeﬃcient Áx 6= 0: Suppose ﬁrst that fiF ¡1 [0;1]
0 6= 0: It follows
that the optimal coeﬃcient Áx=4 = ½¡kfiF ¡1 [0;1]
0 6= 0 for all k; and that jÁx¯¾=4j is an
increasing function in k: Hence there exists a ¯ k ¸ 1 such that for any k ¸ ¯ k; the condition
(A.10) is violated, and thus implies indeterminacy of the REE.
Case 2: optimal coeﬃcients Á¼ 6= 0; Áx = 0: Suppose instead that in the optimal
non-inertial plan, fiF ¡1 [0;1]
0 = 0: In this case, the optimal coeﬃcient Áx = 0 for all k; and
the characteristic polynomial det









˜ p(¹) ´ ¹
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k¡2 + Á¼·¾
As before, the system (A.8) has a unique bounded solution if and only if the k roots of ˜ p(¹);
denoted ¹1;¹2;:::;¹k; lie inside the unit circle. A necessary condition for the system (A.8)














= jÁ¼·¾j < 1: (A.11)
75Suppose that fiF ¡1 [1;0]
0 6= 0: It follows that the optimal coeﬃcient Á¼ = ½¡kfiF ¡1 [1;0]
0 6= 0
for all k; and that jÁ¼·¾j is an increasing function in k: Hence there exists a ¯ k ¸ 1 such that
for any k ¸ ¯ k; the condition (A.11) is violated, and thus implies indeterminacy of the REE.
Case 3: optimal coeﬃcients Á¼ = Áx = 0: Suppose ﬁnally that in the optimal non-
inertial plan, fiF ¡1 = [0;0]: In this case, the optimal coeﬃcient Á¼ = Áx = 0 for all k; and
the characteristic polynomial det









ˆ p(¹) ´ ¹
2 ¡ (1 + ¯ + ·¾)¹ + ¯:
Since ˆ p(0) = ¯ > 0; ˆ p(1) = ¡·¾ < 0; and ˆ p(+1) = +1; the polynomial ˆ p(¹) admits one
root inside and one root outside the unit circle. This implies indeterminacy of the REE.
A.4 Proposition 6
Proposition 6. Suppose that a bounded optimal state-contingent plan exists. Then in
the case of any parameter values ¾;·;¸x;¸i > 0 and 0 < ¯ < 1; a commitment to the rule
described by (1.17) – (1.19) implies a determinate rational-expectations equilibrium.
Proof: The system of equations given by the structural equations (1.1), (1.2) and the
policy rule (1.17) – (1.19) can be written in matrix form as in (A.5), where zt ´ [¼t;xt]
0 ;
Zt ´ [xt¡1;it¡1;it¡2]












1 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 ¾ 1 0
0 0 0 ¯ 0 0


















0 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 1
0 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 ¾
0 0 0 1 ¡· 0
¡¾¸x
















As discussed in the subsection 2.1, the equilibrium is determinate if the characteristic poly-
nomial det
£ ¯ A ¡ ¹¯ I
¤
has exactly nZ = 3 roots such that j¹j < 1. Recall that if there are
76fewer such roots, there is no bounded solution at all. Since the rule (1.17) – (1.19) is derived
from the ﬁrst-order conditions (1.13) – (1.15), it must be consistent with the optimal state-
contingent plan. Because we assume that a bounded optimal state-contingent plan exists, it
must be the case that det
£ ¯ A ¡ ¹¯ I
¤
admits at least 3 roots inside the unit circle.
Note that we can rewrite the characteristic polynomial as
det






















2(1 + ¯)¸x + ·2
¯¸i
:
We can furthermore express p(¹) as
p(¹) = (¹ ¡ ¹1)(¹ ¡ ¹2)(¹ ¡ ¹3)(¹ ¡ ¹4);
where, because of the symmetry in (A.13), the four roots ¹i satisfy
¹1 = (¯¹2)
¡1 ; and ¹3 = (¯¹4)
¡1 : (A.14)
Because det
£ ¯ A ¡ ¹¯ I
¤
admits at least 3 roots inside the unit circle, (A.12) and (A.13) imply
that p(¹) admits either two, three, or four roots inside the unit circle. Let us consider each
case in turn:
² Let us suppose ﬁrst, as a way of contradiction, that all four roots of p(¹) are inside
the unit circle. Then j¹1j < 1 by assumption. However (A.14) implies j¯¹2j > 1; and
thus j¹2j > 1; which contradicts the assumption that all four roots are inside the unit
circle.
77² Let us suppose next that p(¹) has three roots inside the unit circle. If j¹1j < 1; then
(A.14) implies again j¹2j > 1: It follows that the remaining two roots ¹3 and ¹4 must
be inside the unit circle. But this is impossible, as j¹3j < 1 implies j¹4j > 1: Inversely,
if j¹1j > 1; then the three remaining roots must be inside the unit circle. Again, this
is impossible as j¹3j < 1 implies j¹4j > 1:
It follows that p(¹) must have exactly 2 roots inside the unit circle, and thus that the
equilibrium is determinate.
A.5 Proposition 7
Proposition 7. Assuming 0 < ¸1 < 1 < ¸2; two bounded stochastic processes fˆ {t; ˆ qtg
satisfy
(1 ¡ ¸1L)(1 ¡ ¸2L)ˆ {t = ˆ qt (A.15)
for all t ¸ 0 if and only if they satisfy










for all t ¸ 0:
Proof: First, we show that (A.15) implies (A.16). Expanding the left-hand side of
(A.15), we obtain
(1 ¡ ¸1L)ˆ {t ¡ ¸2 (1 ¡ ¸1L)ˆ {t¡1 = ˆ qt;
or equivalently
(1 ¡ ¸1L)ˆ {t¡1 = ¡¸
¡1
2 [ˆ qt ¡ (1 ¡ ¸1L)ˆ {t]
= ¡¸
¡1
2 Et [ˆ qt ¡ (1 ¡ ¸1L)ˆ {t]:
Substituting recursively for (1 ¡ ¸1L)ˆ {t+j on the right hand side, we obtain



















78where the last equality holds since 0 < ¸
¡1
2 < 1: Thus (A.15) implies (A.16).
Second, we show that (A.16) implies (A.15). Since (A.16) holds for all t ¸ 0; it implies
that










Multiplying both sides by (1 ¡ ¸2L) and taking conditional expectations at date t, we obtain
























= Et [Lˆ qt+1]
= ˆ qt:
Thus (A.16) also implies (A.15).
A.6 Proposition 8
Proposition 8. Suppose that ¾;· > 0;0 < ¯ < 1; and 0 < ° · 1: Then in the factorization
A(L) = ¯° (1 ¡ ¸1L)(1 ¡ ¸2L)(1 ¡ ¸3L) (A.17)
of the polynomial
A(L) ´ ¯° ¡ (1 + ° + ¯°)L +
¡
1 + ° + ¯






there is necessarily one real root 0 < ¸1 < 1; and two roots outside the unit circle. The
latter two roots are either two real roots ¸3 ¸ ¸2 > 1; or a complex pair ¸2;¸3 with real part
greater than 1: Three real roots necessarily exist for all small enough ° > 0; while a complex
pair necessarily exists for all ° close enough to 1:
Proof: Consider the following properties of the polynomial (A.18):
A(z) > 0;8z · 0 A0 (z) < 0;8z · 0




79From this, we know that for all z · 0; A(z) is positive and decreasing. As z is raised
from 0 to ¯, A(z) continues to decrease, reaches a minimum (where A(z) may be positive
or negative), and starts increasing as z approaches ¯. The polynomial A(z) is positive for
z = 1; but decreases again and tends to ¡1; as z becomes larger and larger. It follows that
A(z), admits one real root z1 > 1 and either two real roots 0 < z3 · z2 < 1; or a pair of
complex roots z2;z3:
Thus A(L) can be written as
A(L) = ¯













¸1 + ¸2 + ¸3
¯¸1¸2¸3
L +






where ¸j ´ z
¡1
j for j = 1;2;3: Comparing the ﬁrst terms of (A.19) and (A.18), we note that
(¯¸1¸2¸3)
¡1 = ¯°; (A.20)
so that the polynomial A(L) can be factorized as in (A.17), where 0 < ¸1 < 1 and ¸2;¸3 are
either two real roots satisfying 1 < ¸2 · ¸3; or a pair of complex roots.
We now show that in the case that ¸2;¸3 form a pair of complex roots, their common
real part is greater than 1. Comparing the second term of (A.19) with the corresponding
term in (A.18), and using (A.20), we note that
¯° (¸1 + ¸2 + ¸3) = 1 + ° + ¯°: (A.21)
Furthermore, as ¯°¸1 < 1; we have
¯°¸1 = 1 + ° ¡ ¯° (¸2 + ¸3 ¡ 1) < 1:
This implies
¡¯° (¸2 + ¸3 ¡ 1) < ¡°;
and thus
¸2 + ¸3 > 1 + ¯
¡1 > 2:
80Therefore




It follows that the moduli j¸2j = j¸3j > 1:
We now show that three real roots ¸1;¸2;¸3 necessarily exist for all small enough ° > 0;
while a complex pair ¸2;¸3 necessarily exists for all ° close enough to 1: First note that each
¸j; for j = 1;2;3; is real if and only if the solution zj ´ ¸
¡1
j of the equation





A1 = ¡(1 + ° + ¯°)
A2 = 1 + ° + ¯






B0 + B1³ + ³
3¢
where
















are real coeﬃcients, each ¸j is real if and only if the corresponding solution ³j of the equation
B0 + B1³ + ³
3 = 0
is real (see Lemma 1 below). From Cardano’s formulas for the roots of a cubic equation, we
know that this equation admits:
81² three diﬀerent real roots if ∆ ´ 27B2
0 + 4B3
1 < 0;
² three real roots, at least two of which are equal, if ∆ = 0;
² one real root and two complex roots if ∆ > 0:








































1 ¡ 10¯ + ¯
2¢
+ 2·¾ (1 + ¯)
¡




























2 + 2·¾ + (1 ¡ ¯)
2¢
;
which is a fourth-order polynomial in °: Note that ∆(°) is a continuous function of ° that












8 + 20¯ ¡ ¯
2¢




It follows that ∆(°) admits either one or three roots between 0 and 1. Furthermore, ∆ < 0
for ° > 0 small enough, and ∆ > 0 for all ° close enough to 1. Thus three real roots
necessarily exist for all small enough ° > 0; while a complex pair necessarily exists for all °
close enough to 1:
A.7 Proposition 9
Proposition 9. Under the assumptions of Proposition 8, and in the case that the factor-
ization (2.9) involves three real roots, a pair of bounded processes
n
ˆ {t; ˆ ft
o
satisfy any of the
equations

















































at all dates t ¸ t0 if and only if they satisfy
Et [A(L)ˆ {t+1] = ¡ ˆ ft (A.25)
at all of those same dates. In the case that a complex pair exists, (A.24) is again equivalent
to (A.25) in the same sense.
Proof: Proposition 8 guarantees that the roots ¸1;¸2;¸3 in the factorization (2.9) are
either real and satisfy 0 < ¸1 < 1 < ¸2 · ¸3; or 0 < ¸1 < 1; and ¸2, ¸3 are complex
conjugates that lie outside the unit circle. Consider ﬁrst the case in which ¸1;¸2;¸3 are real.
Rule I.
We ﬁrst show that (A.25) implies (A.22). Using (2.9) to substitute for A(L); and ex-
panding the left-hand side of (A.25), we obtain
¯°Et [(1 ¡ ¸1L)(1 ¡ ¸2L)ˆ {t+1 ¡ (1 ¡ ¸1L)(1 ¡ ¸2L)¸3ˆ {t] = ¡ ˆ ft;
or
(1 ¡ ¸1L)(1 ¡ ¸2L)ˆ {t = (¯°¸3)
¡1 ˆ ft + ¸
¡1
3 Et [(1 ¡ ¸1L)(1 ¡ ¸2L)ˆ {t+1]:
Substituting recursively for (1 ¡ ¸1L)(1 ¡ ¸2L)ˆ {t+j on the right hand side, we obtain


















which corresponds to (A.22).
We next show that (A.22) implies (A.25). Since (A.22) holds for all t ¸ t0; it implies
that









83Multiplying both sides by ¯° (1 ¡ ¸3L); taking conditional expectations at date t, and using
(2.9), we obtain


























= ¡ ˆ ft:
which corresponds to (A.25).
Rule II.
To show that a pair of bounded processes
n
ˆ {t; ˆ ft
o
satisfy (A.23) at all dates if and only if
they satisfy (A.25) at all dates, we simply need to repeat the above steps, replacing ¸2 with
¸3 and vice versa.
Rule III.
Let us now allow ¸2;¸3 to be either real values, or complex conjugates, lying outside the
unit circle. Since (A.25) implies both (A.22) and (A.23), we know that (A.25) implies
(1 ¡ ¸1L)
·


























which is obtained by summing (A.22) and (A.23) on both sides and dividing by 2. Thus
(A.25) implies (A.24).


























Multiplying both sides by ¯° (1 ¡ ¸2L)(1 ¡ ¸3L); taking conditional expectations at date






























































































where 0 · ® ´ 2
¸2+¸3 < 1; and vt ´ ¡Et
h
(1 ¡ ®L¡1) ˆ ft
i
: This implies furthermore













= ¡ ˆ ft;
which corresponds to (A.25).
A.8 Proposition 10
Proposition 10. Under the assumptions of Proposition 8, and a loss function with ¸x;¸i >
0; each of the rules I, II, and III has a representation of the form
it = (1 ¡ ½1)i
¤ + ½1it¡1 + ½2∆it¡1 + Á¼Ft (¼) +
Áx
4




85for all values of ° for which the rule is well-deﬁned, and in this representation
½1 > 1; ½2 > 0
0 < µ¼ · Á¼
0 < µx = Áx:
Furthermore, for given values of the other parameters, as ° ! 0 (for rule I) the coeﬃcient
µ¼ approaches zero, though Á¼ approaches a positive limit; while as ° ! 1 (for rule III) the
coeﬃcients µ¼ and Á¼ approach the same limit.
Proof: Proposition 8 guarantees that the roots ¸1;¸2;¸3 in the factorization (2.9) are
either real and satisfy 0 < ¸1 < 1 < ¸2 · ¸3; or 0 < ¸1 < 1; and ¸2, ¸3 are complex
conjugates that lie outside the unit circle. Consider ﬁrst the case in which ¸1;¸2;¸3 are real,
so that both rule I and rule II are well-deﬁned.
Rule I:
First note that the rule I, i.e., (2.11) can be rewritten as
ˆ {t = ½1ˆ {t¡1 + ½2∆ˆ {t¡1 + (¯°¸3)
¡1 vt (A.27)
where
½1 = 1 + (¸2 ¡ 1)(1 ¡ ¸1) > 1


















86Since Et ˆ ft+j is given by
Et ˆ ft+j =
·¾
¸i


























































˜ ®¼;¡1 = ¡° (A.28)




˜ ®¼;j = ¡¸
¡j+1








3 °; 8j ¸ 1 (A.30)
and
®x;¡1 = ¡1 (A.31)





3 ¯° + ¸
¡j
3 (1 + ¯°) ¡ ¸
¡j¡1
3 ; 8j ¸ 1: (A.33)







































































; 8j ¸ 0:








˜ ®¼;j = 1











































Combining (A.27) and (A.34), we can rewrite the rule I as
ˆ {t = ½1ˆ {t¡1 + ½2∆ˆ {t¡1 + Á¼Ft (ˆ ¼) +
Áx
4

































¸3 + ¯°2¸3 ¡ ¯°¸3 ¡ °













Recalling that ˆ zt ´ zt ¡ ¯ z for any variable z; and that Áx = µx; we can rewrite (A.35) as







We know from Proposition 9 that (2.10) holds, and thus that (2.5) holds. In the steady
state, equation (2.5) reduces to
A(L)(¯ { ¡ i





(1 ¡ ¯°) ¯ q =
·¾
¸i
(1 ¡ ¯°)(1 ¡ °) ¯ ¼:
It follows from (2.9) that
(1 ¡ ¸1)(1 ¡ ¸2)i
¤ = (1 ¡ ¸1)(1 ¡ ¸2)¯ { +
·¾
¸i
(1 ¡ °)(1 ¡ ¯°)
¯° (1 ¡ ¸3)
¯ ¼: (A.38)
Given that
(1 ¡ ¸1)(1 ¡ ¸2) = 1 ¡ ½1;
and given that (A.36) implies
·¾
¸i
(1 ¡ °)(1 ¡ ¯°)
¯° (1 ¡ ¸3)
= ¡(Á¼ ¡ µ¼);
we can rewrite (A.38) as
(1 ¡ ½1)i
¤ = (1 ¡ ½1)¯ { ¡ (Á¼ ¡ µ¼) ¯ ¼:
Combining this with (A.37) yields (A.26).
As ° approaches 0, we have ¸
¡1
3 ! 0 and ¸3° ! ¯









































Following the same development as for rule I, but replacing ¸2 with ¸3 and vice versa,
we can show that (2.12) can also be written as in (A.26), but where
½1 = 1 + (¸3 ¡ 1)(1 ¡ ¸1) > 1






















We now allow the roots ¸2 and ¸3 to be either real or complex. Recall from the proof of
Proposition 8 that (¸2 + ¸3)=2 is real and is greater than 1. Using this, rule III (2.13) can
be rewritten, for all values of ° 2 (0;1]; as













where ½1 and ½2 are now given by


































































and where ˜ ®I
¼;j; ®I
x;j are deﬁned in (A.28) - (A.33) for all j ¸ 1; ˜ ®II
¼;j; ®II
x;j are deﬁned in the
same way except that ¸3 is replaced with ¸2: Using (A.42) and (A.43), equation (A.39) can
90furthermore be written as









































































































































¸2¸3 is real.) Note




































































(1 ¡ °)(1 ¡ ¯°)








91As for rule I, we can rewrite (A.35) as in (A.37), but where the coeﬃcients are given in
(A.40), (A.41), and (A.45) – (A.47). Again, we know from Proposition 9 that (2.5) holds,

























(1 ¡ °)(1 ¡ ¯°)














= 1 ¡ ½1
·¾
¸i¯°
(1 ¡ °)(1 ¡ ¯°)






= ¡(Á¼ ¡ µ¼);
we can rewrite (A.49) as
(1 ¡ ½1)i
¤ = (1 ¡ ½1)¯ { ¡ (Á¼ ¡ µ¼) ¯ ¼:
Combining this with (A.37) yields (A.26).












Proposition 11. Under the assumptions of Proposition 8, a pair of bounded processes
n
ˆ {t; ˆ ft
o
satisfy













at all dates t ¸ t0 if and only if they satisfy
Et [A(L)ˆ {t+1] = ¡ ˆ ft (A.51)
at all of those same dates.
92Proof: Proposition 8 guarantees that 0 < ¸1 < 1; and that ¸2;¸3 are either real values,
or complex conjugates, that lie outside the unit circle.
First we show that (A.51) implies (A.50). Using (2.9) to substitute for A(L); and









































Et [D(L)ˆ {t¡1] = ¸
¡1








































Et [(1 ¡ ¸1L)ˆ {t¡1] = ¸
¡1





























93which corresponds to (A.50).
We next show that (A.50) implies (A.51). Since (A.50) holds for all t ¸ t0; it implies
that













Multiplying on both sides by ¯° (1 ¡ ¸2L)(1 ¡ ¸3L); taking conditional expectations at date
t, and using (2.9), we obtain






















= ¡ ˆ ft:
which corresponds to (A.51).
A.10 Proposition 12
Proposition 12. Under the assumptions of Proposition 10, the optimal target criterion

















Ft (x) = µ¼¼t¡1 +
µx
4
xt¡1 ¡ µi (it¡1 ¡ i
¤) ¡ µ∆∆it¡1 (A.53)
in which
Áx = µx > 0;
0 < µ¼ · 1;
and
µi;µ∆ > 0:
Furthermore, for ﬁxed values of the other parameters, as ° ! 0; µ¼ approaches zero and the
other parameters approach the non-zero values associated with the target criterion (1.25).
Instead, as ° ! 1; µ¼ approaches 1.
94Proof: The optimal target criterion (A.52) can be written as


















































































































˜ ®¼;¡1 = ¡°





































8j ¸ 1; and
®x;¡1 = ¡1

































































































; 8j ¸ 0:







Combining (A.54) and (A.55), we can rewrite the optimal target criterion as
·¾
¸i
S¼Ft (ˆ ¼) +
¸x¾
¸i






ˆ xt¡1 = ¡¯°¸2¸3 (ˆ {t¡1 ¡ ¸1ˆ {t¡2):
Recalling that ˆ zt ´ zt ¡ ¯ z for any variable z; we have
·¾
¸i










¡¯°¸2¸3 ((1 ¡ ¸1)(it¡1 ¡¯ {) ¡ ¸1∆it¡2);




Ft (x) = µi¯ { + (1 ¡ µ¼) ¯ ¼ + µ¼¼t¡1 +
µx
4
xt¡1 ¡ µiit¡1 ¡ µ∆∆it¡1 (A.57)
where
















96We know from Proposition 9 that (2.10) holds, and thus that (2.5) holds. In the steady
state, equation (2.5) reduces to
A(L)(¯ { ¡ i





(1 ¡ ¯°) ¯ q =
·¾
¸i
(1 ¡ ¯°)(1 ¡ °) ¯ ¼:
Using (2.9), we have furthermore
µii





(1 ¡ ¯°)(1 ¡ °) ¯ ¼
= µi¯ { +
¸i¯°(1¡¸1)¸2¸3
·¾S¼
¯° (1 ¡ ¸1)(1 ¡ ¸2)(1 ¡ ¸3)
·¾
¸i
(1 ¡ ¯°)(1 ¡ °) ¯ ¼
= µi¯ { +

















= µi¯ { + (1 ¡ µ¼) ¯ ¼:
Combining this with (A.57) yields (A.53).
As ° approaches 0, it follows from Lemma 2 below that ¸
¡1






¢¡1 > 0; and thus













































! 0; and ˜ ®¼;j ! ¸
¡j
2 ; for



















97for all j ¸ 0: Instead, as ° = 1; we have S¼ ! 1; and
µ¼ ! 1:
So far, we have considered the case in which ¸2 6= ¸3: Now suppose, alternatively, that









































































˜ ®¼;¡1 = ¡°




˜ ®¼;j = ¡j¸
¡j+1






¡ (2 + j)¸
¡j¡1
2 °; 8j ¸ 1
and
®x;¡1 = ¡1





2 ¯° + (1 + j)¸
¡j
2 (1 + ¯°) ¡ (2 + j)¸
¡j¡1
2 ; 8j ¸ 1
98The variable vt can again be written as in (A.55), where as before ®¼;j =
˜ ®¼;j




















































Note that S¼ is equal to the value obtained in (A.56), when ¸2 = ¸3. In addition, the




j=0 ®x;j = 1: It follows that the optimal
target criterion can again be expressed as in (A.53) where the coeﬃcients are deﬁned as
before.
A.11 Technical Lemmas
Lemma 1. For any real coeﬃcients A0;A1;A2;A3; we have
A3z
3 + A2z
2 + A1z + A0 = A3
¡































































































= A3z3 + A2z2 + A1z + A0: ¥
99Lemma 2. In the limit, as ° approaches 0, ¸3 ! +1; and °¸3 ! ¯
¡1:
Proof: In the limit, as ° tends to 0; the polynomial A(L) reduces to
A(L) = ¯
¡1 ¡
¯ ¡ (1 + ¯ + ·¾)L + L
2¢
(¡L);
and can again be factorized as
A(L) = ¯
¡1 (z1 ¡ L)(z2 ¡ L)(z3 ¡ L);
where z3 = 0; and z1;z2 are the two roots of the second-order polynomial
˜ A(L) = ¯ ¡ (1 + ¯ + ·¾)L + L
2:
Note that since ˜ A(0) = ¯ > 0; and ˜ A(1) = ¡·¾ < 0; the two roots of ˜ A(L) are real and
satisfy 0 < z2 < 1 < z1: It follows that
0 < ¸1 < 1 < ¸2 < ¸3 = +1
where ¸j ´ z
¡1
j ; for j = 1;2;3:





¡1 ¡ ¸1 ¡ ¸2
¢
:
Taking the limit as ° ! 0 on both sides and noting that ¸1 and ¸2 are bounded, we obtain
lim
°!0
¸3° = ¯
¡1:
¥
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